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 In this dissertation, I propose that trust is an important yet under-studied concept 
in supply chain relationships both upstream in a Business-To-Business (B2B) context and 
downstream in a Business-To-Consumer (B2C) context. In the first essay, I investigate 
the evolution of trust in buyer-supplier relationships in a VMI setting. Supply chain 
management literature is rich in pointing to the benefits generated by collaborative supply 
chain arrangements, however recently the dark side of these collaborative relationships 
has been reported as well. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to bring in a 
new dimension – “length of the relationship” to these research models. Using survey data 
collected from distributors that use VMI, we find that longer relationships are associated 
with lower levels of distributor trust in the manufacturer. This erosion of trust over time 
is fully mediated by the distributors’ experience of psychological contract violation. Our 
findings demonstrate that good inventory performance may not be sufficient to maintain 
trust in VMI relationships, but regular communication between parties, as well as 
nonverbal documented agreements, may also be needed to maintain trust.  
 
 In the second part of the dissertation, I study the effectiveness of third-party trust 
seals that have emerged as a prominent mechanism to enhance trust in B2C online 
markets. Despite their common use by practitioners, systematic research studies of the 
effectiveness of trust signals are scarce. Exploiting a unique dataset of over a quarter 
million transactions across 493 online retailers, this study empirically measures the value 
and effectiveness of trust seals on the likelihood of purchase by shoppers. Th  dataset is 
collected from a randomized field experiment by a large trust seal provider, which 
enables us to infer the causal impacts of the presence of a trust seal. It is found that the 
presence of the online trust seal increases the odds of completion of purchase. I further 
find that online trust seals serve as partial substitutes for both shopper experience and 
seller size, which makes the seal more useful for first timevisitors at a web site and also 
for smaller online retailers.  Interestingly, the effect of he number of trust seals is subject 
to diminishing marginal returns, such that the presence of additional seals does not 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Confucius, a long time ago, proposed that trust is a fundamental requirement for 
all social exchanges. Trust plays a key role in personal relationships between individuals 
in different settings including families, schools, groups and organizations. Supporting this 
point of view, Blau (1964) views trust as an important ingredient of sable relationships 
in society. Hirsch (1978) assesses the role of trust in economic exchanges and suggests 
that trust is a “public good” required for a functioning economic system. Fukuyama 
(1995) further suggests that the inherent trust level in a society is a major predictor of the 
economic development of that society. Viewing commerce as a form of social exchange, 
we can confidently say that an understanding of trust is also essential for businesse .  
 American society is quite diverse. Globalization, fueled by developments in 
information technologies, has further pushed this society to interact with people from 
different cultures, both in the US and across the globe. Practices of tablishing trust 
solely based on personal experience, interpersonal similarities, common social status, 
trusted third parties and family ties etc., are no longer sufficient in global relationships on 
the internet. Moreover, Mistzal (1996) suggests that the mechanisms for cooperation and 
solidarity in the society have weakened significantly and it is es ential to find new 
alternatives. With the emergence and growth of new forms of business cooperation, such 
as joint ventures, networked firms and supply chain partnerships, businesses ed a better 
comprehension of the trust concept to develop successful relationships both within and 
across business units. 
 In this dissertation, I study two problems regarding the role of trust in supply 
chain management. In the first essay, I examine the evolution of trust in collaborative 
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supply chain relationships in a business-to-business (B2B) distributor-manufacturer 
context. Focusing on a particular technology – Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) – and 
using survey data, I empirically test the effect of VMI relationship length on distributors’ 
trust in their manufacturers. In the second essay, I move to a business-to-consumer (B2C) 
context and shed light on trust transfer along the supply chain through online trust seals. 
Using a large archival dataset comprising over a quarter million online shopping carts, I 
provide evidence that online trust seals are valuable technologies in enhancing consumer 
trust in the e-commerce world. 
 In the remaining sections of this chapter, I introduce the research settings for my 
dissertation, namely - Vendor Managed Inventory and Electronic Commerce.  
1.1 VENDOR MANAGED INVENTORY (VMI) 
1.1.1 Automatic Replenishment Programs (ARP)  
 Competition and shorter product cycles have pushed companies to re-evaluate 
their distribution and inventory management systems (Myers et al., 2001). Viewing 
inventory as a liability rather than an asset, firms have looked for new ways of managing 
their inventories. ARPs provide a solution to firms that suffer from high safety stock, low 
return on assets and obsolete items in warehouses. In this program, sellers use the sales 
and inventory data provided by the buyer to automatically replenish stock at the buyer’s 
premises. Daugherty et al. (1999, pp. 64) observe that the main benefit of this program 
comes from “substituting information for inventory.” To enhance effectiv  acquisition 
and transfer of information, ARP require the presence of underlying components, such as 
bar-coding, electronic data interchange (EDI) and decision support systems. 
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 Along the supply chain, downstream retailers have frequently utilized ARP to 
manage their inventories. For example, Procter and Gamble used ARP to manage 
inventories of their product portfolio at large retailers, such as K-Mart and Wal-Mart 
(Myers et al., 2000). Different forms of ARP have been used in a variety of industries. 
Daugherty et al. (1999) cite two forms - Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) and Quick 
Response (QR): ECR is common in the grocery industry, while QR is widely used in the 
apparel industry. Along the same line, retailers have encouraged the evelopment of 
Collaborative Planning Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) initiatives to add joint 
planning and forecasting of inventory by the buyer and seller. As VMI is the most 
commonly used form of ARP, next I present VMI in more details. 
1.1.2 VMI as a subset of ARP 
 As a form of supply chain coordination initiative, Vendor Managed Inventory 
(VMI) was first used as part of the Efficient Consumer Respon e program by Wal-Mart 
and Procter & Gamble (Kurt Salmon Associates Report, 1993). In this type of 
relationship, the upstream manufacturer manages the inventory of Stock Keeping Units 
(SKU) at the downstream retailer’s premises. While it is always the upstream party 
managing the inventories at a downstream firm, the titles of these parties may be 
different. In the auto industry, the downstream firm could be an auto manufacturer having 
inventories managed by upstream suppliers of auto parts and assemblie . In our study, as 
depicted in Figure-1, the downstream firms are called distributors while the upstream 
firms are called manufacturers. Sticking to our VMI nomenclature, the manufacturer 
usually gets paid by the downstream distributors only when a sale is real zed. In return, 
the distributor shares sales information with the manufacturer (Cetinkaya & Lee, 2000).  
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Figure-1: Our nomenclature of VMI relationships 
 
 It is important to note that VMI programs have resulted in significant changes to 
the conventional supply chain relationships. For example, transfer of inventory decision-
making from the distributor to the manufacturer, coupled with a shift in financial 
responsibility of inventories, could pose adaptation challenges to the VMI users. Also, 
VMI requires the distributors to share confidential sales data with the manufacturer. 
Therefore, as distributors become vulnerable to the actions of the manufacturers, inter-
organizational trust becomes operational in VMI relationships.  
1.2 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
1.2.1 Information asymmetry 
 Online markets are characterized by a significant amount of inf rmation 
asymmetry in comparison to offline settings. Traditional brick and mortar shoppers 
usually get to “feel and touch” the product before making a purchasing decision and 
observe product quality directly. Daignault et al. (2002) assert that “Trust depends on 
identity, the condition of being distinguishable from others” and one can not group past 
experiences into a meaningful history without identity. Verification of the brick and 
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investment in the store assortment, and personal communication with customer , often 
serve to signal quality in traditional settings. As noted by Zaheer et al. (1998), while a 
few of these features are replicable online, others are not. Hence, innovative mechanisms 
are needed to reduce information asymmetry in electronic markets and bring online 
markets closer to conventional markets in the eyes of online shoppers. 
 Two issues that plague online markets are privacy concern of consumers about 
their personal information and security threats, such as confidence fraud, unauthorized 
access and attacks to consumer computers from the internet. A large part of the emphasis 
relating to online security has been targeted at preventing unauthorized access and 
hackers, as evidenced by the huge growth in the sale of anti-virus and anti-spyware 
software, spam filters, firewalls, among others. Surprisingly, according to the figures 
published by the Internet Crime Complaint Center (2007), of the 206,884 complaints 
received in 2007, almost two thirds were about online retailers not delivering as 
promised. Credit card and check frauds comprised only 12.3 percent of the total. 
Increasingly, online retailers are beginning to understand the importance of mechanisms 
that signal their reliability and quality to potential customers. 
1.2.2 Sources of retailer information for consumers 
 Online shoppers can typically get information regarding merchant reliability and 
quality from three types of sources before making a purchasing decision (Daignault et al. 
2002). First-party information is provided directly by the online retail r. The quality of 
the website design, contact information, existence of a privacy policy, and past 
performance reports, may all be useful in inducing trust. Two operational variables: 
Technological capabilities of the web site (Ba & Johansson, 2008) and quality of the 
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online service (Field et al., 2004) also lead to customer satisfaction. The advantage of 
direct communication between the shopper and online retailer however, may sometimes 
be offset by the possible information biases and lack of independent verification of 
merchant claims. Second-party information about the online retailer c n be provided by 
previous shoppers through reputation systems and rating mechanisms. Some online 
retailers, such as Amazon.com, enable shoppers to view the feedback provided by 
previous shoppers. Consumer review websites may host feedbacks regarding both the 
products and web sites. Finally, third-party mechanisms – the focus of this study – can 
provide independent verification of a retailer’s trustworthiness. Such independent 
verification is usually provided by specialized companies such as buySAFE, TRUSTe 
and VeriSign that investigate the quality claims of the online retailers and allow the 
approved retailers to display a trust seal on their websites. Alternatively, some agencies 
such as Better Business Bureaus (BBB) may publish directories f trusted e-merchants. 
Third party ratings are relatively more important in e-commerce compared to brick and 
mortar businesses due to the inherent difficulties of establishing identity and conveying 
trust in the online world.  
1.2.3 Third party online trust seals 
 Trust certification authorities, also called “seal providers”, have been classified 
into three major categories by the Trust Seal Review (http://trustsealreview.com). The 
first category includes Privacy Seal Providers, such as “TRUSTe” and “Trust Guard”. 
These providers ensure that the e-merchant has a privacy policy and treats the private 
data of shoppers confidentially. The second category includes Security Seal Providers, 
such as “VeriSign” and “GeoTrust”, which provide digital certificates and secure SSL 
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connections. The third category of trust seals is called “Busines  V rification Seals”. In 
this category, “Better Business Bureau - BBB” investigates the ID of the e-merchant and 
makes sure that the merchant represents itself truthfully. “buySAFE” provides identity 
verification for businesses and enables bonded purchases as well. I should here also 
acknowledge that some seals provide more than a single functionality like “buySAFE”. 
For example, VeriSign seals also serve for business identity verification and NexTag 
seals provide price comparison service as well as business identity verification. A sample 
of trust seal logos is provided in Table-1.This study focuses on onli e retailers that host, 
among others, a trust seal provided by the focal third-party certification firm. 
Table-1: Some trust seals frequently used in e-commerce 





1.2.4 Operations of online trust seal providers 
 Typically, seal providers first set their minimum privacy and safety requirements 
expected from online stores. The focal trust-seal provider performs a stringent review of 
online retailers seeking a “trust certificate/seal” for financial stability, verifiable identity, 
and a successful business track record. Online retailers satisfying the criteria determined 
by the trust-seal provider are then certified in return for a fee to be paid by the retailer. 
The focal seal provider also requires that the certified online retailer allow monitoring of 
website operations and performance in every transaction following certification. The 
focal trust-seal logo is then displayed by the online retailer s an endorsement of its 
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quality claims by an independent verification authority. Shoppers can then verify the seal 
by clicking on it and seeing the membership status of the online retailer.  
 Overall, we can say that trust seals are commonly used in e-commerce today. 
Preferred more by small-to-medium sized online retailers, tru t seals could help bridge 
the confidence gap experienced by online shoppers due to information asymmetr , on the 
web sites of these retailers. 
1.3 CONTRIBUTION 
 Given the scarcity of empirical trust studies in a business context, this dissertation 
contributes to the supply chain management body of knowledge in two ways, (i) showing 
how B2B trust evolves over time in collaborative buyer-supplier relationships, and (ii) 
how trust transfer through 3rd party online trust seals influences decision making in the 
B2C supply chain contexts. Overall, our findings indicate that supply chain technology 
solutions could influence the trust among supply chain members in different ways. While, 
downstream in the supply chain, trust seals could increase the consumers’ trust in the 
online retailer, upstream distributors using the VMI technology could experience trust 
erosion in their relationship with the manufacturers. Thus, in adopting boundary-spanning 
supply chain technologies, it is of utmost importance to consider the effects of the 







CHAPTER-2: THE EVOLUTION OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
TRUST IN VMI RELATIONSHIPS 
2.1 THE TRUST CONCEPT 
 Being trustworthy is fundamentally an ethical and moral duty owed by the trustee 
to the society in general and to the trustor in particular (Hosmer, 1995). Mayer et al. 
(1995, pp. 712) define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to th  actions 
of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” 
The authors further discuss that being vulnerable shows that the trustor has something 
important to lose, and that the trustor takes a risk by making him/herself vulnerable. 
Similarly, McEviliy et al. (2003, pp. 99) define trust as “willingness to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations about another’s intentions or behavior.” 
Zaheer et al. (1998, pp. 143) define inter-organizational trust more broadly as “the 
expectation that an actor 1) can be relied on to fulfill obligations 2) will behave in a 
predictable manner 3) will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility of opportunism is 
present.” Lewis & Weigert (1985) focus on risk and interdependence in a relationship and 
suggest that both are both essential for trust to make a differenc . If actions can be 
completed with no risk (uncertainty) involved, trust will not be needed (i. ., matter). 
Thus, Rousseau et al. (1998, pp. 392) define trust as “willingness to be vulnerable under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty.” Deutsch (1958) posits that the outcome of a decision 
must bear some uncertainty and be important for the trusting parties, making them 
vulnerable (at least to a degree) for trust to be operational. Overall, the initial Mayer et al. 
(1995) definition is the most comprehensive one, applicable at both individual and 
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organizational levels. In the context of this essay, which comprises VMI relationships 
between downstream distributors and upstream manufacturers, the distributors using VMI 
are taking risk by outsourcing their materials management function. Therefore, I will base 
my work on the Mayer et al.’s (1995) definition of trust. 
 Blois (1999) contrasts the trust and trustworthiness concepts and shows t at 
trustworthiness is a characteristic of the trustee and the trustor additionally considers the 
contextual factors and its own disposition to trust. He also suggests that trust is seldom 
offered unconditionally in the form of blanket trust, but that one party trusts the other in 
some particular areas or issues.  
 As a complex concept, trust has multiple dimensions. Rousseau et l. (1998) 
propose that there are four different forms of trust. Deterrence-based trust is based on the 
idea that the other party cannot act opportunistically because socital or institutional 
sanctions will make it costly to breach the trust. Calculus-based trust stems from the 
rationality of decision makers where the incentives and governance structures will make 
it irrational for the other party to breach trust. The third form is relational trust, which 
develops after successful interactions among parties. The final form of trust is institution-
based trust (i.e. legal systems and cultural norms). In a logistics context, we can cite 
Knemeyer (2000) as an example presenting a model of trust that includes dimensions of 
trust as well as its determinants and consequences in logistics ou sourcing relationships. 
Next, we discuss the antecedents and outcomes of trust. 
2.1.1 Antecedents of trust 
 In the theoretical trust literature, two main factors have been studied as 
antecedents of one party’s trust in the other, (i) characteristics of the trustee, and (ii) the 
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trustor’s propensity to trust others. Ability, integrity and benevolence of the trustee are 
the most frequently cited characteristics that lead to trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Butler, 
1991). In well established relationships, repeated prior interactions allow the trustor to 
collect data about ability, integrity and benevolence of the trustee, however in new 
relationships, the trustor may need to rely on the reputation of the trust e as a source of 
information (Ganesan, 1994). 
 Trustor’s own propensity-to-trust may be another factor that could partially 
explain the variability in trust (Mayer et al., 1995). Individuals have their own inherent 
disposition to trust, while firms may also differ in their willingness to trust other firms as 
part of their organizational culture. Therefore, in order to understand why one party trusts 
another, it is important to consider the trustor’s general willingness to trust and the 
characteristics of the trustee as perceived by the trustor. 
 In a supply chain context, Kwon & Suh (2004) studied the factors affecting the 
level of trust in buyer-seller relationships and found that relationsh p pecific asset 
investments and information sharing are positively associated with trust. Morgan & Hunt 
(1994) provide empirical evidence that shared values and higher levels of communication 
between supply chain partners are likely to increase trust, whileopportunistic behavior is 
likely to reduce trust. Doney & Cannon (1997) identified two factors: supplier’s size and 
willingness to customize as significant drivers of a buyer’s tru t in the supplier.  Finally, 
Ganesan (1994) demonstrates that in a buyer-supplier relationship, trustor’s satisfaction 
with the trustee’s performance is a major determinant of trust. Briefly, we may say that 
factors driving trust include characteristics of the trustee, trustor’s propensity to trust, and 
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some relationship parameters such as communication and satisfaction wi h previous 
outcomes. 
2.1.2 Outcomes of trust 
 Trust’s influence on outcome variables comes in two main ways: direct effects on 
performance parameters; and trust’s facilitating role betwen drivers of performance and 
outcome variables. Trust has been shown to reduce transaction costs and increase supply 
chain performance in exchange relationships (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Absence of trust 
requires that every contingency be planned in advance and written into a contract; 
transactions have to be scrutinized against opportunistic behavior, all of which increase 
transaction costs. Additionally, trust results in “more positive attitudes, higher levels of 
cooperation and superior levels of performance” for employees in a workplace (Dirks & 
Ferrin 2001, pp. 450).  Interpreting trust as a facilitator, Dirks & Ferrin (2001) 
demonstrate that presence of trust influences the trustor’s interpretation of the current and 
future behavior of the trustee, thereby reducing contextual uncertainty. This positive 
interpretation forms the basis of the moderating effects of trust between factors such as 
motivation, group processes, and organizational change on work attitudes, perceptions 
and performance outcomes. Finally, Seppänen et al. (2007) reviewed 15 empirical trust 
papers in the 1990 – 2003 period, and observed that trust is a “reciprocal con ept” and 
has been modeled as both a cause and affect in inter-organizational relationships. 
2.1.3 Approaches of different disciplines to the trust concept 
 The trust concept has been approached differently by a variety of disciplines. 
Rotter (1967, pp.651) for instance, defines interpersonal trust from a psychologist’s 
viewpoint as “an expectation held by individuals or groups that the word, promise, verbal 
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or written statement of another can be relied on.” Doney & Cannon (1997, pp.46) report 
that marketing researchers who have examined trust related to suppliers and salespersons 
suggest that “inter organizational trust operates as a governance mechanism that mitigates 
opportunism in exchange contexts characterized by uncertainty and dependence.” In a 
similar vein, Morgan & Hunt (1994) develop the “Key Mediating Model” where they 
suggest that an agent (downstream channel member) that trusts its principal (supplier) is 
more likely to cooperate and commit harder for that principal. They also propose that 
trust reduces uncertainty in the relationship. Economists assume that in exchange 
relationships, parties are inherently untrustworthy and may act opportunistically if proper 
governance mechanisms are not in place (Barney & Hansen, 1994). The founder of 
Transaction Cost Economics theory, Williamson (1979), recommends that the interests of 
both parties be aligned through idiosyncratic investments to make untrustwo thy behavior 
irrational to the parties. Finally, organizational researchers view trust to be a major 
attribute of functioning organizations. (Argyris, 1962; McGregor, 1967) 
 In a supply chain context, two theoretical lenses have commonly been adopted in 
scholarly research, including the study of trust in organizational rel tionships. The first is 
Transaction Cost Economics used by Zaheer et al. (1998), Nooteboom et al. (1997), and 
Mollering (2002). Based on this theory, trust is proposed as a substitute for costly control 
and coordination mechanisms. The second is the Social Capital Theory (Ganesan, 1994; 
Smith & Barclay, 1997; Young-Ybarra & Wiersama, 1999) which views economic 
exchanges as based on reciprocity. Any benefit provided to an organizatio  is expected to 
be reciprocated in the future by that organization based on mutual trust (Blau, 1964; Uzzi, 
1997). Thus, trust is viewed as a kind of “relational lubricant” that enhances knowledge 
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transfer and joint efforts between parties (Inkpen, 2001). Acknowledging that trust has 
been studied at both personal and organizational levels, next we discuss inter-
organizational trust. 
2.1.4 Inter-organizational trust  
 Although an inherently individual-level psychological state, the trust concept has 
been researched in inter-organizational relationships as well. Zaheer et al. (1998) 
empirically show that interpersonal and inter-organizational trust are two distinct but 
strongly correlated constructs. “Boundary spanner” individuals establih relationships 
among organizations that may / may not share the organization’s orientation towards 
another firm. However, the authors (Zaheer t al., 1998, pp. 142) provide evidence that 
“organizations develop a collective view about each other after repat d transactions,” 
and that organizational culture often shapes the trust orientation of the individuals. 
Consequently, the authors (Zaheer t al., 1998, pp. 143) propose, “Inter organizational 
trust describes the extent to which organizational members have a collectively held 
orientation toward the partner firm,” and find that performance of a buyer-supplier link is 
strongly related to inter-organizational trust.   
 At an inter-organizational level, trust has been studied from a buyer-supplier 
angle (Lane & Backman, 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2003), in joint ventures (Madhok, 1995; 
Inkpen & Curall, 2004) and with strategic alliances (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Das & 
Teng, 1998). A major benefit of trustful relationships is that trust educes the need to 
write complicated contracts between organizations that may be costly to put together and 
enforce, thereby lowering transaction costs. (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Gulati, 1995). 
Given the importance of the topic, Seppänen et al. (2007) review trust articles in inter-
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organizational relationships and conclude that the theory in this field is still developing. 
In addition, despite the quantity of theoretical trust papers, empirical t ust studies are rare 
(e.g. Ganesan, 1994; Sako & Helper, 1998; Young-Ybarra & Wiersama, 1999; Mollering, 
2002) and often inconsistent, as it is difficult to operationalize the trust concept. This 
essay makes a contribution by bringing inter-organizational trust st dies into the supply 
chain management body of knowledge through a study of VMI programs.  
2.1.5 Evolution of trust 
 The level of trust between individuals, groups or parties evolves as parties interact 
with each other. Rousseau et al. (1998, pp. 402) suggest that societal control and 
institutional mechanisms may “serve as a springboard in creating trust,” while some 
forms of trust, such as calculative trust, may be more effective early in a relationship, and 
could develop into relational trust over time. In a case study, Ratnasingam (2005) studies 
the evolution of trust in e-commerce relationships between Cisco and Compaq, and 
observes that technological trust develops over time in stages into rela i nal trust in this 
dyadic relationship. In their experimental study of trust erosion, Elangovan et al. (2007) 
observed that in some circumstances, trustors could forgive up to two violations before 
erosion hits and suggest that trustee’s inability to perform obligations causes less trust 
erosion than trustee’s unwillingness to perform.  It is important to note that studies in 
“evolution of trust” are rare in the empirical trust literature due to the data requirements 
to test the research models. Having introduced the trust concept, next, I discuss the 





2.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT VIOLATION  
 Complementing formal contracts, psychological contracts are also important 
aspects of relationships. Usually, parties have some ideas and expectations about the 
reciprocal obligations in a relationship, which is called “psychological ontract”. 
(Robinson, 1996) It is called a psychological contract because an understa ing of the 
perceived obligations by one party may not be shared by the other party. Building on 
these differing perceptions, one party may observe that the other has not fulfilled a 
promise; hence resulting in feelings of injustice, resentment, and betrayal; which is called 
psychological contract violation (Robinson, 1996). Briefly, we can say th t experiencing 
psychological contract violations does not only depend on what the other party does, but 
also how those actions are perceived. 
 There are two main conditions that result in the experience of psychological 
contract violation: Reneging and Incongruence. Next, we discuss them in more details.
2.2.1 Reneging and Incongruence 
 One party’s unwillingness or inability to fulfill a promise is called reneging and it 
is agreed by both parties that there is an obligation not being fulfilled by one party. 
Environmental turbulence, between the time of promise and fulfillment, may cause a 
party to break a promise, or sometimes the more powerful partymay intentionally renege 
as well. (Morrison & Robinson, 1997) The second condition is incongruence between 
perceptions, where, parties have different understanding of the reciprocal obligations. 
This incongruence may produce cases where one party believes a promise was 
completely fulfilled, while the other party perceives that there are unfulfilled promises, 
and consequently experiences psychological contract violation. Klatzky (1980) illustrates 
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that promises could get distorted in human memory which could generate incongruence 
between perceptions over time.  
 Robinson (1996) asserts that there are three main factors that could pr duce 
incongruence. The first factor is divergent schemata. Parties in a relationship may have 
different schemata that they use to make sense of events happening around them. Also 
viewed as cognitive frameworks, organizations may have different schemata due to 
differences in previous experiences and organizational cultures. The second factor is the 
complexity and ambiguity of the tasks commonly performed by the parties. Given 
bounded cognitive capacity and bounded rationality of human beings, it is highly 
probable that each party could approach a complex task from a different angle, thus 
producing an idiosyncratic simplification and understating of the task complexity. Also, 
the parties may interpret and bridge the ambiguities in different ways based on their 
unique experiences, which produces incongruence in understanding a task and assigning 
mutual responsibilities.  Finally, the third factor is lack of communication between 
parties. In the rapidly changing business environment of today, absence of regular multi-
lateral communication between organizations may result in incongrue ce in perceptions. 
Overall, one can say that promises could be forgotten or distorted in memory over time, 
which generates incongruence, if not resolved, could cause the experience of 
psychological contract violation.  
 Trust and Psychological Contract Violation (PCV) are strongly re ated but two 
distinct concepts (Robinson, 1996). The literature is rich in pointing out to the important 
role of trust in psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1989; Morrison & Robins n, 1997). 
Both concepts are fundamentally measured at the individual level and they are boundary 
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spanning concepts where a second party is always involved. As both variables are used in 
our research model, it is important to mention the distinctiveness of them. Trust is 
willingness to take risk based on positive expectations about the futureactions of the 
trustee, regardless of the ability of the trustor to control the actions of the trustee. 
Psychological contract violation is about feelings of anger and resentment, when the 
other party fails to fulfill obligations. First of all, psychological contract violation 
requires the presence of a psychological contract about mutual obligati ns in a 
relationship which may not be the case in deciding to trust another party. While violation 
of a psychological contract is experienced only based on an account of past interactions 
with the other party, trusting another party is about willingness to take risks in the future. 
Also, should we mention that reciprocity of obligations is the key for psychological 
contract violation, but not for trusting beliefs. Unidirectional perceptions of ability, 
integrity and benevolence are the determinants of trust (Mayer et al., 1995). For example, 
in a buyer-seller relationship, the seller’s repeated failures to deliver shipments on time 
will hurt the buyer’s trust in the seller and may also cause the buyer to experience 
psychological contract violation. But if the buyer also defaulted prviously (i.e. not paid 
on time), seller’s failures may not cause a violation of the psychological contract as the 
buyer considers its own failures and view a zero balance in the psychological contract. 
Having reviewed the inter-organizational trust and psychological contract literatures, I 
now turn to Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). 
2.3 VENDOR MANAGED INVENTORY (VMI) 
 Chapter-1 introduced the VMI concept and laid the research context. In this 
section, I will discuss the characteristics of VMI that relat s to inter-organizational trust.            
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VMI has been found to reduce information distortion along the supply chain (Chen et al., 
2000), and increase inventory turnover and reduce stock-outs in the manufacturer-retail r 
channel. The manufacturer benefits from synchronization of inventory and tr nsportation 
decisions through long term retailer commitment, and from increased purchase quantities, 
while the retailer enjoys savings in holding costs, fewer stock-outs and cash flow benefits 
(Dong & Xu, 2002). Similarly, Kulp et al. (2004) examine the impact of VMI on 
manufacturers’ profitability and find that VMI increases manufact rers’ profit margins. 
Cachon & Fisher (1997) also report that VMI increases inventory performance, but 
attribute these improvements to information sharing through EDI, which is a 
technological requirement for VMI implementation. 
 On the other hand, the literature points to some drawbacks of VMI as well. For 
example, Nannery (1994) observed that VMI causes significant changes i  traditional 
buyer-seller relationships. Downstream VMI users (distributors) have to transfer their 
control on the materials management function to the upstream partner (manufacturers), 
which could cause loss of critical purchasing and inventory management skills. 
Moreover, in VMI relationships distributors often have to share their proprietary data 
with the manufacturers, which is risky. Williams (2000) observed that after starting to use 
VMI, buyers become more dependent on their suppliers. A survey of VMI users by 
Roberts (2004) found that while buyers (distributors) make significat g ins by VMI 
adoption, suppliers’ (manufacturers) main reason to accept VMI is to retain customers. 
Lee (2004, pp. 9) reported, “In fact some VMI systems have generated f iction, because 
buyers have refused to share costs with the suppliers.” This unequal sharing of costs and 
benefits could be a point of conflict among VMI users. 
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 Overall, with all its pros and cons, VMI is a type of partnership between a buyer 
and a supplier, or between a distributor and a manufacturer in our nomenclature. As in 
any other business partnership, a degree of trust is essential (Pohlen & Goldsby, 2003). 
While power and dependence are also important, adoption of VMI requires the distributor 
to trust that the manufacturer could manage its inventory more efficiently than if it was 
self-managed by the distributor. Therefore, maintenance and development of trust 
between VMI partners is of utmost importance and in this essay, we investigate the role 
of VMI relationship length on the distributor’s trust in its manufacturer.  
2.4 RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The literature in evolution of trust in buyer-seller relationships is quite mixed in 
terms of the direction of evolution (upwards or downwards). Social Exchange Theory 
posits that longer relationships bear higher trust as positive results over time increases the 
partners’ trust in each other (Blau, 1964; Dwyer et al., 1987). Gulati & Singh (1998) even 
use the prior history of ties as a proxy for inter-organization l trust. However, Moorman 
et al. (1992) and Young-Ybarra & Wiersama (1999) found no link between the length of 
a relationship and inter-organizational trust. On the contrary, Grayson & Ambler (1999) 
find empirical evidence that longevity in advertising service relationships is negatively 
related to the buyer’s trust in the service provider. Therefore, loking at the supply chain 
management literature, it is difficult to see a clear direction on evolution of trust in buyer-
supplier relationships. 
 Having some idiosyncratic attributes, participating in a VMI relationship could 
have a negative influence on trust in buyer – seller relationships. First, VMI is a unique 
collaborative process that requires a distributor to transfer inventory decision- making to 
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the manufacturer. Evanko (2010) suggests that VMI results in the loss of two core 
competencies: purchasing and inventory management for the distributors. Perceived lack 
of control and flexibility in these core competencies, coupled with vulnerabilities brought 
by sharing confidential data with the manufacturer - such as sale , inventory, price and 
promotion - may generate hard feelings on the distributor side. Overall, Williams (2000) 
observed that after starting to use VMI, buyers become more dependent on their 
suppliers. Trust is best bred in mutual dependencies (Emerson, 1962) and distributors’ 
increased dependence on their VMI manufacturers carries the potential to make the 
relationships unstable and to reduce the distributors’ trust in their manufacturers. 
 On the manufacturer side, the literature points out to the asymmetry in sharing 
VMI benefits between manufacturers and retailers. Roberts (2004) and Lee (2004) both 
wrote that it is the distributors that get the larger share of supply chain benefits produced 
by adopting VMI. This unequal sharing of costs and benefits could cause the 
manufacturer to renege and seek fairness by limiting performance, which could be 
perceived as a breach of the psychological contract by the distributors.  
 Finally, rapid staff turnover and the informal nature of VMI agreements could 
have a negative effect on distributors’ trust in their manufacturers. Mentzer et al. (2000) 
observed that VMI relationships take quite a long time to establish (2 years average), and 
given the high rate of employee turnover in many industries, it is not unusual that key 
staff who started the VMI transition are different from those who completed it. As most 
of the VMI implementation process is executed by informal agreements, frequent 
changes in key personnel are likely to cause loss of accumulated information and 
consensus, which could increase the extent of conflicts in the relationship resulting in 
 
 22
perceived breach of the psychological contract. Mentzer et al. (2000) demonstrate that 
quite a significant portion of enablers and inhibitors in VMI relationships are people-
related soft factors rather than technological factors. Therefore, all else equal, the unique 
attributes of VMI relationships carry the seeds to allow distributors to experience 
psychological contract violations as the relationship ages. Hence, we hypothesize:  
 H1: A distributor’s length of VMI relationship with a par ticular 
manufacturer is positively related to the degree of distributor’s psychological 
contract violation experienced with that manufacturer. 
 Violation of a psychological contract is often associated with broken promises 
which erode the perceived benevolence and integrity of the violator. In an org izational 
context, Robinson (1996) demonstrated that an employee’s feelings of p ychological 
contract violation will lead to loss of trust towards his/her employer.  In a buyer-seller 
context, Hill et al. (2009) investigated the link between experience of psychological 
contract violation and two dimensions of trust: dependability and benevolence. 
According to the authors, suppliers, that experience psychological contra t violation in 
their relationship with buyers, tend to evaluate the dependability and benevolence of 
those buyers negatively; therefore eroding the perceived trustworthiness of the buyers.  
Similarly, in a VMI context, we also expect that feelings of psychological contract 
violation will lead to loss of trust. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 H2: A distributor’s experience of psychological contract violation with a 




 Erosion of trust in a buyer-seller relationship does not necessarily happen 
instantly.  Distributors, observing that the manufacturer does not fulfill obl gations, may 
(i) forgive the manufacturer by acknowledging its own limited effort in the relationship, 
(ii) forgive the manufacturer by considering the hostile environmental factors that could 
have prevented the manufacturer from fulfilling an obligation, or (iii) g ve signals of 
frustration, anger and disappointment to the manufacturer (Elangovan et al., 2007). If the 
manufacturer does not address the distributor’s perception of psychological contract 
violation, then the distributor adjusts the level of trust put into that mnufacturer 
downwards. We believe that length of a relationship has no direct eff ct on perceived 
trustworthiness of a supply chain partner and expect that psychological contract violation 
is the mechanism linking both. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 H3: The relationship between length of a VMI relationship and trust is 
mediated by psychological contract violation. 
 Figure-2 plots our research model. 
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2.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.5.1. Research Design 
 In this study, we use a commercial online survey tool – SurveyMonkey, to collect 
cross-sectional data from distributors which are having their inventori s managed 
partially/fully by manufacturers through a VMI arrangement. The unit of analysis was the 
firm and key informants are executives/senior managers overseeing th  VMI relationship 
with manufacturers. Similar to Dyer & Chu (2003) who treated vulnerable suppliers in 
the auto industry as trustors and the powerful auto manufacturers as trustees, I consider 
distributors as trustors and manufacturers as trustees due to the fac  that by accepting 
VMI, the distributors are made vulnerable to the actions of the manufacturer. Each key 
informant is associated with a different distributor. The questionnaire was designed to tap 
into each distributor’s relationship parameters with its largest manufacturer with which 
the distributor has a VMI agreement. 
 The sampling frame consists of distributors who have their inventoris managed 
by manufacturers. In this VMI arrangement, the communication infrastructure is 
established through the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) technology. A third party 
information services provider facilitates the EDI/VMI arrangement between the 
distributor and the manufacturer. Despite its critical role, the information services 
provider does not intervene in the VMI adoption decision of the parties, but only provides 
its expertise to allow both parties to have a well functioning VMI arrangement. 
Moreover, the information services provider holds annual conferences to bring its 
manufacturer and distributor customers together and facilitate sharing of best practices. 
The distributors share item level point of sales (POS) data and inventory levels with the 
 
 25
manufacturers daily using the Product Activity Data document (EDI 852).  The 
manufacturer replenishes the distributor inventories based on this set of data. The 
distributors are not subsidiaries of the manufacturers but they are independent entiti s a d 
the distributors also own the inventories at their premises. Finally, all distributors in our 
sample operate in North America with 96 percent being US firms and 4 percent are 
Canadian. 
 The third party information services provider agreed to sponsor our research by 
sharing the contact information of all of their distributor customers (200 of them) with us. 
The distributors mainly came from the Electrical Supplies, Auto Parts and Supplies, 
Plumbing, Consumer Goods and Industrial Products sectors.  
 The survey was pre-tested by both researchers and industry professionals. An 
early draft was reviewed by three logistics and supply chain researchers for content, 
clarity, flow and coherence. Then, the survey was sent to two industry professionals and 
it was pre-tested, resulting in further improvements. Finally, in order to encourage 
participation, we promised to donate $2 to the National Wildlife Federation for each 
completed survey. 
 As shown in Appendix A, our sponsor sent a pre-notification letter to its 
distributors before we launched the survey in order to encourage their participation. A 
week after the pre-notification letter, a link to the survey wasemailed to each distributor. 
This first wave was followed by two subsequent waves separated by a week, generating a 
total of 57 responses. (Please see Appendices B, C and D for the invitatio  emails sent at 
each wave.) To increase the response rate, the invitation emails were always sent on 
Tuesdays (to avoid busy Mondays after the weekend) at 10:00 AM (afterthe early 
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morning email traffic). The first wave produced 38 responses, the second wave produced 
17 responses, and third wave produced 2 responses. The questionnaire was designed 
primarily by using the tested measures from previous studies in the literature, but also 
some new measures were used as detailed in Section 2.5.3. The items measuring a single 
construct were grouped together in the questionnaire and each section started with a brief 
description of its content. The survey had a total of 32 questions (listed in Appendix E), 
which is well below 125 - the upper threshold suggested by Dillman (1978) to achieve a 
good response rate. 
 Finally, we did some research about different regression techniques to stimate 
our model, such as OLS (Ordinary Least Squares), SEM (Structural Equ tion Modeling) 
and PLS (Partial Least Squares). Nasser & Wisenbaker (2003) recommend that for any 
covariance based SEM, a minimum of 100 observations are required to obtain reliable fit 
statistics, while Marsh et al. (1998) suggest a minimum sample size of 200. Therefore, 
covariance based SEM was not a good choice in estimating our model. We also 
considered PLS analysis which estimates model parameters by maximizing the dependent 
variables’ variance that could be explained by the independent variables. PLS does not 
make distributional assumptions about variables and is applicable to smaller sample sizes 
as few as 50 observations (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004; Chin & Newstead, 1999). Barclay 
et al. (1995) recommend that a sample in PLS analysis should have a minimum size of 10 
times the number of items in the most complex construct in the res a ch model. This 
corresponds to a sample of 60 observations (10 x 6), as our most complex construct – 




 Given the relatively high sample size requirements of SEM and PLS,  we 
preferred OLS regression to analyze the collected survey data, like two recent similar 
studies by Hill et al. (2009) and Villena et al. (2011). Although network models using 
latent variables can more accurately be analyzed by SEM, our limited sample size makes 
OLS a more reliable option. However, our sample size of 57 observations is very close to 
the minimum of 60 as suggested by Barclay et al. (1995) and we will do the robustness 
check of our main OLS results by estimating our model on PLS as well. 
2.5.2 Profile of the distributors and key informants  
 Following the recommendation of Kumar et al. (1993), we requested our sponsor 
(third party information services provider) to identify a senior manager / executive for 
each distributor as our key informant, who is in charge of overseeing the day-to-day VMI 
relationship with the manufacturer. The profiles of the key informants to our survey are 
illustrated in Table-2.  Forty percent of the respondents held positions at the director or 
higher levels such as Director of Purchasing, Vice President of Operations, and Director 
of Supply Chain Management. Forty-three percent occupied managerial roles such as 
Procurement Manager, Alliance Manager and IT Manager. Remaining 17 percent of the 
respondents were comprised of specialists such as IT Analysts and EDI Administrators.  
Table-2: Profile of key informants 
Position held in the distributor firm Percent 
Director / CEO / President / Vice President 40 % 
Manager / Department Head 43 % 
Analyst / Specialist  17 % 
  
 We also asked our key informants the length of their personal invo vement in 
their firm’s relationship with the VMI manufacturer and found out that the key 
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informants who completed our survey are very familiar with the particular VMI 
relationship we ask them to respond. As shown in Figure-3, 65 percent of our key 
informants have been personally involved for 7 years or more with the manufacturer, 7 
percent have been personally involved for 5-6 years, 16 percent have been personally 
involved for 3-4 years and 9 percent have been personally involved for 1-2 years. Only 3 
percent of our respondents reported that they have been involved with the manufacturer 
for less than a year. Thus, based on the profiles of our key-respondents and the length of 
their involvement with the manufacturers, we are confident that our key- espondents are 
competent and knowledgeable to complete our survey. 




















 Finally, we provide some information about the profiles of distribu ors in our 
sample. Figure-4 shows that majority of the distributors that participa ed in our study are 
small to medium sized enterprises. Seventy percent of these distributors have between 50 
and 500 employees and 13 percent of our responses came from relatively l rg r firms 




























 Regarding the industry sectors, we see that 45 percent of the distributors in our 
sample come from the Electrical Supplies industry, while 35 percent ar  in the Auto Parts 
and Supplies industry. Consumer Goods, Plumbing and Industrial Products industry 
sectors are also represented in our sample as illustrated in Figure-5.  














2.5.3 Measurement of variables 
 Most of the measures were adapted from the extant trust and supply chain 
literatures. In order to increase clarity, minor adjustments were mad  in a few items based 
on feedback from industry professionals. We preferred to use five-point Liker scale (0: 
Strongly disagree; 4: Strongly agree). 
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 Our dependent variable Trust intends to capture a distributor’s trust in it  largest 
VMI manufacturer by using 6 items. Benevolence, integrity, ability and fairness 
dimensions of the trust concept were represented by separate items. Two items measuring 
the perceived benevolence of the manufacturer were adapted from Dyer & Chu (2000) 
and Doney & Cannon (1997) papers. Perceived integrity of the manufacturer was 
measured by an item adapted from Zaheer et al. (1998) paper. Distributor’s perceived 
fairness of the VMI manufacturer was measured by an item adapted from Dyer & Chu 
(2000). As ability could be context specific, we developed an item to measure the 
perceived ability of the manufacturer in a VMI context. Finally, to perform a reliability 
check on the Trust construct as suggested by Dyer & Chu (2000), we added the following 
item, “This supplier has a reputation for trustworthiness in the business world.” 
 The independent variable in our model is Length of VMI Relationship which is 
measured by a direct item in the questionnaire, “How long has your firm been using VMI 
with this supplier? (Round to the nearest year)” Five choices include “Less than a year”, 
“1-2 years”, “3-4 years”, “5-6 years” and “7 years or more”. 
 The mediating variable in our model is Psychological Contract Violation (PCV). 
This variable intends to capture the degree of psychological contract violation 
experienced by a distributor in its VMI relationship with the manuf cturer. Four out of 
the five items used to measure the PCV variable were adapted from the work of Hill et al. 
(2009) while one item was developed by us.  
 We have included five very important control variables to make sure that our 
results are reliable. Propensity-to-Trust (PTT) variable wasadded as a control variable 
for two reasons; (i) to make sure that the key informant’s inheret t ust propensity does 
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not confound our results (ii) to control for any potential common method bias cre ted by 
the key informant’s affective states. Two items of the PTT construct were adapted from 
Mayer et al. (1995) and one item was self developed. Size of the distributor was added to 
the model to control for unobservable distributor heterogeneity. Measuring the Size 
variable, two self developed items probed the number of employees and total revenue of 
the distributor in year 2010. As performance is a significant predictor of trust, supply 
chain performance variable was included in our model as a control variable. Three self-
developed items probed (i) the reduction in inventory levels, (ii) increase in inventory 
turnover and, (iii) reduction in safety stocks due to VMI use. Communication is a single 
item variable and it was self developed to capture the change i  distributor’s 
communication with the manufacturer after adoption of VMI. Finally, the distributor’s 
industry was included to control for unobservable industry effects. 
2.5.4 Summary statistics 
 We provide the descriptive statistics of the key variables in Table-3. The Trust 
construct has a mean score of 3.07. Considering that the item scoresrang  from lowest 
trust: 0 to highest trust: 4, on a 5 point Likert scale, we can say that the average trust 
among distributors is quite high. Similarly the Psychological Contract Violation (PCV) 
construct has a mean of 0.69 showing that perceived psychological contract viol tion 
among distributors is low, but the standard deviation of 0.60 indicates that there is a 
significant amount of variation in PCV among distributors. The Propensity to Trust 
(PTT) variable has a mean of 2.16 which means the key informant’s inherent disposition 
to trust is moderate. In other words, our key informants neither extend blind 
unconditional trust to the external business world nor suspect every action of their 
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partners. The Performance variable has a mean of 2.62 out of 4.00 which points to above 
average performance improvement after adoption of VMI. Finally, the two industry 
dummies show that 45 percent of the respondent distributors came from the electrical 
supplies industry while 35 percent came from the automotive parts and upplies industry, 
and the remaining 20 percent make up the base category (Consumer Goods, Plumbing, 
Industrial Products and Utility) for these two dummies. 
Table-3: Descriptive statistics  
Latent Variable: Linear 
combination of the items  
Mean SD 
TRUST  3.07 0.49 
PCV 0.69 0.60 
PTT  2.16 0.54 
PERFORMANCE  2.62 0.71 
Industry Auto 0.35 0.48 
Industry Electrical 0.45 0.50 
 
2.6 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY CHECKS 
2.6.1 Non-response bias test 
 Out of the 200 respondents we contacted, 5 respondents had previously opted out 
of any survey invitation from the online survey tool - SurveyMonkey, therefore our 
invitation email was not sent by SurveyMonkey to these distributors. Four respondents 
mentioned that their firms did not use VMI. Twenty-nine email addresses had problems 
resulting in our e-mails bouncing back. We did manage to reach 162 distributors, and 57 
of them completed the survey resulting in a response rate of 35.19 percent. Although the 
high response rate could alleviate some concerns, we still tested for non-response bias 
using two different methods as suggested by Lambert & Harrington (1990). 
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 First, we compared the non-respondents and respondents across two 
demographics: distributor’s industry and key informant’s gender. As we had the names of 
the key informants as well as distributor web addresses, we managed to collect the gender 
and industry information. As illustrated in Table-4, among respondents, 82 percent of the 
key informants were male, while among non-respondents, 83 percent of keyinformants 
were male. Comparing the industries that the distributors operated in, we see that 
electrical supplies, plumbing and consumer goods industries were represented very 
closely among both respondents and non-respondents. Although, the automotive industry 
had a slightly smaller representation among non-respondents (29 to 35 percent), overall 
we see that our set of respondents is very close to the group of non-respondents in terms 
of key informant gender and industry. 
Table-4: Non-response bias test using demographics  
 Percent among 
Variable respondents non-respondents 
Gender of the key informant:  Male  82 % 83 % 
Industry – Electrical supplies 45 % 43 % 
Industry Automotive 35 % 29 % 
Industry Plumbing 13 % 10 % 
Industry Consumer Goods 5 % 4 % 
  
 Our second non-response bias test compared early and late waves of the 
completed questionnaires based on the suggestion of Armstrong & Overton (1977) that 
late responses proxy for non-respondents. Twenty-one distributors completed th  survey 
on the day it was emailed out and this set was tagged the “early wave”. An additional set 
of 21 distributors, at the bottom of our respondents as sorted by date of resp nse, were 




Figure-6: Depiction of early vs. late respondents 
 
 We compared the early and late waves across three variables: distributor’s trust in 
the manufacturer, distributor’s length of the VMI relationship with the manufacturer and 
distributor’s number of employees. Our t-test, as summarized in Table-5, failed to find 
any statistically significant difference between early and late respondents, thus lending 
support to the absence of non-response bias in our survey. 
Table-5: Non-response bias test results using early vs. late respondents 
Variable t-value 
Trust -0.44 
Length VMI -0.69 
No. of  Employees 0.66 
 
2.6.2 Common Method Bias Tests 
 Common method bias is a potential problem in behavioral sciences when the 
same person provides the items measuring the dependent and independent variables 
(Bogozzi et al., 1991). In our study, only one person from each distributor firm 
completed the entire survey, therefore we took the common method bias issue seriously 
both during the design of survey and throughout the statistical analysis. 
  In designing the survey, we included the propensity-to-trust (PTT) variable in the 
models to control for method biases. Podsakoff et al. (2003) discuss the partial 
correlation procedure as a way to control for the impact of method variance and suggest 
that the main idea of this procedure is to “use a measure of the assumed source of the 
March 22 April 6 March 28 March 22 
Early wave: 21 responses Late wave: 21 responses 15 responses 
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method variance as a covariate in the statistical analysis.” The authors further cite two 
factors, both related to the individual differences of key informants, as causes of the 
common method variance (i) key informants’ affective states and, (ii) their tendency to 
respond in a socially desirable manner. Watson & Clark (1984) view aff ctivity as the 
“mood dispositional dimension” of an individual. In the same line, we have measured the 
dispositional trust attitude of our key informants through the propensity-to-trust (PTT) 
variable and included it in our models, to control for the common method variance 
caused by affective states. 
 Another procedural remedy we took in design of the survey against common 
method bias is to include reverse-coded items. Hinkin (1995) suggests that use of 
negatively worded items can partially alleviate the negative effects of response pattern 
biases. In order to prevent the survey completion from turning into a monotonic task and 
encourage a more controlled attitude, we have utilized reverse-coded items in the survey. 
For example, Trust, PCV and PTT constructs included at least one reverse-coded item for 
this purpose. 
 In addition to the precautions in the survey design phase, we also examin d the 
common method bias during the statistical analysis phase as well. Using Herman’s 
single-factor test, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis b  using all items in our 
study (Aulakh & Gencturk, 2000) and analyzed the unrotated factor solution to identify 
the distinct factors that could explain the majority of the variance i  the variables. We 
found that four different factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one and these four 
factors together accounted for 78.11 percent of the variance. Neither a single factor 
emerged from the exploratory factor analysis, nor a single variable accounted for 
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majority of the covariance among items, thus we can conclude that common method 
variance is not a significant issue for our study (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
2.6.3 Discriminant Validity 
 Next we provide the inter-factor correlations for analyzing discriminant validity in 
Table-6. All inter-factor correlations are below the 0.85 threshold (Brown, 2006); 
therefore we can confirm that the constructs are distinct from one another.  
Table-6: Discriminant validity  
 Trust Length_VMI  Performance PCV PTT Size 
Trust  1      
Length_VMI   0.19  1     
Performance  0.23  0.17  1    
PCV -0.63  0.30 -0.36  1   
PTT  0.46 -0.04  0.06 -0.31 1  
Size  0.30  0.19  0.43 -0.25 0.25 1 
 
2.6.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 Finally, we conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to check the internal 
consistency of the factors. Although model fit statistics are very s nsitive to sample size 
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1985) and given our small sample of 57 observations, we see that 
our model reasonably fits the survey data: Chi-Square = 232.12, d.f. = 142, P = 0.01, CFI 
= 0.90, RMSEA = 0.10. (Bogozzi & Yi, 1988; Hu & Bentler, 1999) In addition, as shown 
in Table-7, all item loadings onto the respective constructs are highly significant and they 
are above the 0.6 threshold (Nunnaly, 1978), except for the second item of the Trust 
construct that had a 0.59 coefficient. As this particular item was previously tested in the 
seminal work of Dyer & Chu (2003), we decided to keep it although it loaded slightly 




Table-7: Item loadings on the factors 
Responses are on a 5 point Likert Scale:                                         






TRUST       
    We receive fair treatment from this supplier.  0.79 0.05 15.94 
    If given a chance, this supplier could take unfair advantage in our 
business relationship. (R) 
-0.59 0.09 6.11 
    When making important decisions, this supplier consider  our firm’s 
welfare as well as its own.  
0.69 0.09 6.97 
    Based on past experience, we can rely on this supplier to keep 
promises made to our firm. 
0.87 0.03 26.07 
    This supplier is competent and capable of providing us with required 
products according to our specifications in a timely fashion.  
0.61 0.14 4.50 
   This supplier has a reputation for trustworthiness in the business 
world.  
0.80 0.05 16.23 
PERFORMANCE     
    Use of VMI has improved our fill rate to our customers 0.87 0.05 17.67 
    Use of VMI has allowed us to reduce our inventory related costs  0.91 0.03 34.64 
    Use of VMI has increased our inventory turnover 0.91 0.03 32.67 
PCV:   
   When I think about what our firm contributed to therelationship with 
this supplier and what we received in return, I feel  
   
    pleased  (R) -0.89 0.03 35.43 
    angry 0.88 0.05 18.77 
    frustrated 0.92 0.01 99.81 
    satisfied  (R) -0.80 0.04 20.59 
    cheated 0.79 0.03 26.91 
PROPENSITY TO TRUST (PTT)     
    Most business partners can be counted on to do what they say they 
will do.   
0.62 0.16 3.79 
    These days, our business should be alert; otherwise some other 
firms are likely to take advantage of us.  (R) 
-0.66 0.16 3.99 
    In dealing with our suppliers and customers, each and every aspect 
of the relationship should be written in a contract to prevent 
opportunistic behavior. (R) 
-0.68 0.15 4.64 
* Items marked (R) are reverse coded 
2.7 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 As we hypothesized that PCV variable mediates the relationship between Length 
of VMI Relationship and Trust, we used Baron & Kenny’s (1986) three st p approach to 
test for mediation, as depicted in Figure-7. In Model-1, the mediating variable - PCV is 
regressed on the independent variable – Length of VMI Relationship. In Model-2, the 
dependent variable -Trust is regressed on the independent variable. Finally in Model-3, 
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Trust is regressed on both the independent variable - Length of VMI Relationship and the 
mediating variable - PCV.  
Figure-7: Baron & Kenny’s (1985) three step mediation model 
 
 Looking at the results in Table-8, we see that, in Model-1, the indepe nt 
variable - Length of VMI Relationship is significant and positively correlated with PCV, 
providing support to our Hypothesis-1. In Model-2, Length of VMI Relationship has a 
negative and significant coefficient demonstrating that longer VMI relationships are 
associated with lower levels of distributor trust. However, when we add PCV as an 
independent variable (Model-3), we see that the Length of VMI Relationship turns 
insignificant. The PCV variable is negative and significant in Model-3 indicating that 
higher levels of PCV are related to lower levels of Trust extending support to Hypothesis-
2. In addition, the explanatory power - R2 increases from 40.24 percent to 54.24 percent 




















mediates the relationship between Length of VMI Relationship and Trust, hence 
providing support to our third hypothesis.  
Table-8: OLS Results 
 Dependent Variable 
  Psychological 






Length of VMI Relationship 0.46*** -0.42** -0.19 
Size of the distributor 0.02 0.52* 0.45 
Supply chain performance -0.41* 0.06 -0.11 
Communication -0.80* 1.23** 0.79* 
Propensity to Trust -0.47* 0.51** 0.39* 
Industry Auto 1.16 1.72 1.65 
Industry Electrical 0.90 -0.16 0.11 
Psychological Contract 
Violation 
 - -0.46*** 
R2 40.18 % 40.24 % 54.24 % 
Adjusted R2 29.45 % 30.27 % 44.61 % 
Significance levels:  * p< 10 %,                       ** p < 5 %,                    *** p < 1% 
 
 Taking a look at the control variables, we see in Model-1 that higher propensity-
to-trust (PTT), higher supply chain performance and better communicatio  leads to lower 
levels of PCV, and that the industry dummies have no effect on PCV. In Model-2, 
Propensity to Trust (PTT) has a positive and significant association with Trust which 
could be expected. Size of Distributor is also positively related to trust which may be 
related to low power asymmetry in the distributor-manufacturer relationship when the 
distributor is larger. Finally, while Communication is significant in all three models, its 
coefficient is smaller in magnitude in Model-3 (1.23 vs. 0.79). Again, referring the Baron 
and Kenny (1986) paper, we can conclude that PCV partially mediates the effect of 
Communication on Trust.  
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 Given the network model of our research, we conducted a partial least squares 
(PLS) analysis by using the Smart PLS software (Ringle, W nde & Will, 2005), to test 
the robustness of our previous OLS findings. The PLS results in Figure-8 demonstrate 
that Length_VMI variable is positively associated with the PCV variable, which in turn, 
is negatively associated with TRUST. The coefficient of the direct path from 
Length_VMI to the TRUST variable is insignificant, pointing to thefully mediating role 
of the PCV variable. Therefore, lending additional support to our previous findings, PLS 
results also provide empirical evidence that length of a distributor’s VMI relationship 
with its manufacturer has a negative effect on distributor’s tru t in the manufacturer. As 
hypothesized, this effect is indirect and mediated by the distributor’s experience of 
psychological contract violation.  
Figure-8: PLS Results 
 
2.8 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our findings show that longer VMI relationships are associated with lower levels 
of distributor trust in the manufacturer after controlling for the effects of (i) VMI 









*** p < 0.01 
Control for: 
    Size 
    Industry Dummies 
    Performance  
    Propensity to Trust (PTT) 
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inherent propensity to trust. Digging deeper to identify the mechanism governing this 
relationship, we present empirical evidence that in longer relationships, distributors 
experience higher levels of psychological contract violation, which in turn causes trust 
erosion on the distributor side.  
The bad news to manufacturers using VMI to manage their distributo s’ inventory 
is that an average distributor’s trust is subject to erosion over tim  after adopting VMI. 
However, the good news is that distributors give indications of their disappointment and 
frustration that leads to trust erosion. As trust erosion is caused mainly by the 
distributors’ experience of psychological contract violation, which comes with feelings of 
anger, resentment, injustice and even betrayal on the distributor side, manufacturers that 
meet regularly with the distributors at multilateral levels could see these signals of 
frustration and act to prevent the relationship from sinking into a deeper crisis. Elangovan 
et al. (2007) suggest that “post-violation analysis” could reduce the extent of the damage, 
therefore listening to the distributor and jointly bridging thegaps in understanding the 
reciprocal obligations could help. In addition, Elangovan et al. (2007) show that the 
extent of trust erosion is higher if the distributor believes that manufacturer is not willing 
to perform duties (rather than believing that the manufacturer is will ng but not able to 
perform). Manufacturers should clarify the reasons if they cannot meet the expectations 
of the distributors and underline the external disturbances preventing them from fulfilling 
their duties, if possible. 
Contacting some industry professionals, we observed that most VMI relationships 
are not governed by formal contracts, but by verbal and informal agreements. This 
creates plenty of room for psychological contracts to rule the relationship. Coupled with 
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the idiosyncratic attributes of VMI relationships, such as loss of distributor competencies 
and flexibility, increased distributor dependence, and unequal sharing of costs; we 
believe that our findings have significant relevance to VMI users.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the evolution of inter-organizational trust 
erosion in VMI relationships. Moreover, we can say that our study is one of the rare 
efforts investigating cognitive and psychological aspects of buyer-supplier relationships. 
Our finding that VMI relationships are subject to trust erosion over time, which 
happens mainly through violation of the psychological contract between business 
partners, has other implications to the VMI users. First, manufacturers should not let VMI 
reduce the amount of communication with their distributors. As Robinson (1996) points 
out, lack of communication is an important factor in generating incongrue ce between 
perceptions of the supply chain partners. Therefore, in addition to the regular meetings 
with distributors, industry-wide VMI conferences could also be helpful in this sense. 
Manufacturers should not assume that distributors only care for perfrmance. While good 
supply chain performance is essential for a successful relationship, our findings show that 
it is not sufficient to maintain trust. Finally, we recommend thatVMI partners rely more 
on legal contracts in governing the relationship and limit the area rul d by psychological 
contracts. The 3rd party VMI technology providers could be instrumental here by 
encouraging the VMI partners to have their agreements in written contracts rather than in 






CHAPTER 3: THE VALUE OF TRUST SEALS IN ONLINE 
RETAILING – AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
 Online trust issues have frequently been cited as the main reason why people 
hesitate to shop on the internet. According to the results of a US survey by Gemalto 
(2008), forty percent of Americans said that they would buy online more if they felt 
confident shopping on the internet. Although the share of e-commerce in total US retail 
sales has steadily increased from 0.7 percent to 3.6 percent between 2000 and 2008 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2008), e-merchants are yet to fully reap the benefits of online commerce 
due to the risks perceived by online shoppers. However, existing issues with online trust 
have led to the emergence of several mechanisms that seek to signal the quality of the 
products as well as merchants. For instance, third-party reviews, and reputation 
mechanisms, among others, seek to reduce the information asymmetry that buyers face in 
online markets. However, one of the most prevalent, but least studied, mechanisms is the 
presence of trust seals provided by third parties. My study is among the first to 
empirically examine the value of one important form of third party certification – online 
trust seals in a Business to Consumer (B2C) setting. In particul, I am interested in 
understanding the impact of trust seals on the likelihood of consumers completing their 
purchase with an online retailer. Using extensive data on over a quarter million shopping 
carts created by shoppers at 493 online retail websites, this study examines the impact of 
online trust seals on their completion rate. I find that while the presence of trust seals 
through trust transfer from a third party has a significant and positive impact on the 
completion rate of online purchases, the influence of trust seals on purchase outcomes is 
non-monotonic. In fact, I show that while increasing the number of trust seals at a 
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retailer’s site increases the consumers’ likelihood of purchase, beyond a limit, the impact 
is negative.   
 This study makes a number of important contributions to research as well as 
practice. First, I use a unique dataset comprising of shopping carts created by consumers 
in real B2C environments. Most importantly, the data originates froma randomized field 
experiment via a third-party certification firm conducting trials by turning the seal ON 
and OFF randomly to investigate the impact of the presence of its trust seal on 
completion of shopping carts by customers. While my research measures the impact of 
trust seals using real shoppers voting with real money, previous research fforts in 
quantifying the value of online trust seals were methodologically limited to surveys and 
lab experiments with student subjects and simulated purchase decisions. Second, my 
investigation sheds light on some important operational issues for online retailers. The 
findings provide insights into where and under what circumstances trust seals may be 
effective. Finally, I empirically show that “more is not alwys better” with trust seals and 
online retailers with just a few trust seals perform better than those with a large number 
of trust seals.  
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. I first provide an overview of the 
related research. This is followed by the development of my resea ch hypotheses. Then I 
describe the data and explain the statistical methodology used to tst my hypotheses. I 
conclude by discussing the findings, open research questions and the managerial impact 





3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 There is a substantial body of research on issues relating to trust spanning 
multiple disciplines with each providing a slightly different persctive. Rotter (1967) for 
instance, defines interpersonal trust from a psychologist’s viewpoint, “a  expectation 
held by individuals or groups that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of 
another can be relied on.” Flores & Solomon (1998) argue that trust cannot be completely 
defined economically but it is more of an ethical concept. Other resa chers (for instance 
see, Wang & Emurian, 2005) highlight the confusion surrounding the definition of trust, 
and observe that credibility, confidence, and reliability are sometimes used to replace the 
abstract concept of trust. More recently, researchers have begun to focus on issues of trust 
in online environments. Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000) for instance assert that trust is an 
important antecedent of e-commerce. 
 Usually found to be a less trustworthy environment by shoppers, online markets 
show some typical characteristics of Akerlof (1970)’s “lemons1 market.” The lack of a 
central control authority on the internet and low cost of entry exacerb te information 
asymmetry problems in online settings. While government regulation of online 
commerce is thought to be infeasible (Tang et al., 2008), it is also feared that the lack of 
regulation will eventually drive out good merchants. Self-regulation through second-party 
feedback and third-party rating mechanisms have risen to fill the need for reliable quality 
and trust signaling mechanisms online. 
 The role of online second-party feedback mechanisms in building trust among 
consumers, and signaling quality of products and sellers in markets such as eBay and 
                                                
1 “Lemon” is a slang term in the US for low quality - clunker cars. 
 
 46
Amazon, has attracted a lot of attention from researchers (for instance, see Pavlou & 
Gefen, 2004; Walden, 2000). I refer readers to Grabner-Kräuter & Kaluscha (2003) and 
Urban et al. (2009) for a critical review of the literature relating to online trust. While 
second-party feedback is usually from anonymous reviewers, third paty r ting 
mechanisms, however, are based on the notion of trust transfer. The literature on trust 
provides evidence that trust can be transferred from an individual to an individual (Strub 
& Priest, 1976) or from a location to an individual (Henslin, 1968), or from a physical to 
a virtual store (Stewart, 2003). More recently, a few researchers have begun to examine 
the role of third-party certification in online environments. For insta ce, Jin & Kato 
(2007) find that online certification attracts risk-averse customers to the market, 
decreases transaction costs for buyers, and helps sellers charge a premium for being 
certified - findings that are also supported by Baye & Morgan (2003).  
 As far as prior research on online trust seals, most of the existing research relies 
on surveys and self-reported measures or simulated lab experiments rather than field 
experiments as is the case in my study. In one of the earliest studies in this context, 
Kimery & McCord (2002) used controlled lab experiments, simulated retail web sites, 
and online questionnaires to examine the value of different online trust mechanisms. 
Based on 622 subject responses, they found that among the four manipulations (TRUSTe, 
BBB, and VeriSign and a privacy policy statement), only viewing TRUSTe was found to 
have a positive effect on consumer trust. McKnight et al. (2004) used a similar controlled 
setting, but observed that privacy seal and industry seals have no significant effect on 
consumer trust. Head & Hassanein (2002) developed a conceptual model for online trust 
and conducted a survey with 223 Canadian subjects to test the impact of online trust seals 
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on consumers’ purchasing behavior. Contrary to their expectations, no sigificant 
relationship was observed between the presence of trust seals and consumers’ purchasing 
behavior. In a related study, Hu et al. (2003) surveyed 120 undergraduate business 
students to investigate the impact of five different trust seals (TRUSTe, VeriSign, 
BizRate, BBB, AOL) on shoppers’ purchasing behavior. Participating subjects were 
asked to imagine purchasing online from an unknown store’s website four types of 
products: a textbook, a printer a pair of shoes and a leather sofa. The subjects were then 
asked to make their purchasing decision first in the absence, then in the presence of a 
trust-promoting seal. The researchers found empirical evidence that some seals increased 
the conversion rates of online shoppers and the seal’s effect does not depend on product 
category.  
 Extending the behavioral studies discussed above, to a real world setting, Nikitov  
(2006) examines observational data from 847 consumer-electronics and computer 
auctions on eBay and finds a significant and positive association between the presence of 
three trust seals (Square Trade, Power Seller and Mask) and shoppers purchasing 
behavior. However, as noted by the author, these findings are difficult to generalize 
outside eBay, as eBay buyers, being more risk-prone and IT sophisticated, do not 
represent an average online shopper. Limited sample size, using eBay specific trust seals, 
and a focus on just two product categories further limit the generalizability of these 
findings. In addition, since the data are of observational nature only, it is hard to argue 
that, in contrast to experimental data, all external factors havebeen controlled for. In a 
more recent study, Benjamin (2009) investigated the trustworthiness of some shopping 
websites certified by two seal providers: TRUSTe and BBB. He found some evidence of 
 
 48
adverse selection where less trustworthy websites prefer to use the trust seals. While 
these studies provide some useful insights, the conflicting findings of earlier studies, and 
the dearth of findings based on real-world data, highlight the need for a large-scale field 
study that provides a systematic analysis of the impact of trust seals on outcomes of 
interest to retailers as well as customers. My study seeks to fill this gap.  
 This study adds to the above mentioned literature on trust and the value of online 
trust seals by analyzing data from a large-scale randomized f eld experiment conducted in 
conjunction with one of the major trust-seal providers. I call this seal used in the 
experimentation “the focal trust-seal” to distinguish it from other trust seals that could 
have been displayed at e-merchant web sites. This study uses actual data comprising 
288,169 observations of shopping carts created by shoppers that made real purch sing 
decisions across 493 retailers online. My study not only examines the impact of the focal 
trust-seal on consumers’ purchase completion but also investigates the impact of multiple 
seals on purchase outcomes. In addition, I also examine the role of shopper experience, 
and merchant-size on the relationship between the presence of trust seals and purchase 
completion rates. Additionally, rather than focusing on a single cat gory, my study 
differs from previous work by examining twenty five product categori s, significantly 
increasing the generalizability of my results. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study that uses data collected by the “seal provider” across many e-merchants. Finally, 
this work is novel in that it is based on data generated from randomized “A/B seal test” 
conducted by the focal trust-seal provider. Trust seals on certified online retailers’ web 
sites were turned on and off randomly by the seal provider to observe the seal’s imp ct on 
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shopper behavior, enabling me to, for the first time in the literature, infer the causal 
relationship between the presence of trust seals and purchase completion rates.  
3.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 Although many online shoppers create carts and add merchandise into them, only 
a small fraction of these carts ever get completed. Some inherent characteristics of the 
online world, such as its impersonal nature, make it difficult for shoppers to verify 
merchant ID and judge product quality before purchase. Various trustinducing 
mechanisms have been developed to reduce the information asymmetry problem of e-
commerce. As discussed earlier, studies by Bernardo et al. (1999) and Hu et al. (2003) 
suggest that the presence of trust seals can reduce the trust gap perceived by online 
shoppers, and have a positive impact on consumers’ propensity to complete their 
purchases in an online store. However, it is important to note that other studies (for 
instance, see McKnight et al., 2004 and Head & Hassanein, 2002) find no value of 
displaying trust seals at online stores. While the popularity of trust-seals among online 
retailers suggest that such trust-seals might be valuable, whether online trust seals have a 
significant and positive impact on purchase outcome remains an empirical question. 
Thus, weighing all evidence together, I hypothesize as follows: 
 H1. Presence of the focal online trust seal at a retailer’s website increases the 
propensity of completion of shopping carts created by online shoppers. 
Interestingly, many online retailers display more than a single trust seal, some 
displaying as many as eight of them as shown in the snapshot from an e-merchant web 




Figure-9: A snapshot from “http://www.techforless.com” 
 
 While I hypothesize trust seals to be valuable and have a positive impact on 
purchase completion, the law of diminishing returns could also apply to the context of 
trust seals. In other words, I expect the marginal impact of each additional trust seal on 
the purchase completion rate to be lower. Hence I hypothesize that: 
 H2. As the number of trust seals at an online store increases, the marginal 
impact of an additional trust seal on the completion likelihood of shopping carts 
diminishes. 
 Differing product values are likely to justify different levels of consumer search 
costs. It is reasonable for a rational consumer to drive to a few shops before buying 
expensive furniture, but not for a gallon of standard milk if it is avail ble at the 
convenience store round the corner. As is well known, shoppers are more likely to be 
risk-averse when it comes to higher value purchases, while ignorin  the risk of low value 
purchases. Swan and Nolan (1985) posit that trust is essential to complete transactions 
that contain a high degree of risk and information asymmetry. Daignault et a . (2002) 
view trust to be based on information and they suggest that risky purchases that involve 
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higher prices require more information to be completed. Given that trust-seals can serve 
as reliable quality signals in online settings, I posit that, 
 H3. The online trust seal is more effective towards completion of higher value 
shopping carts than lower value shopping carts. 
 Most online shoppers feel more comfortable shopping at well known online 
retailers’ web sites Gemalto (2008). Big players in the e-commerce world, such as 
“Amazon.com”, have established reputation over years of business through millions of 
satisfied consumers and they have significant vested interests as well (i.e. brand, capacity 
investments) larger than any incentive to cheat (Ippolito 1990). Smith & Brynjolfsson 
(2001) also find empirically that a merchant’s reputation and brand serve as proxies for 
the merchant’s credibility. However, most small online retailers do not have well-known 
brand names, nor do they have large sunk investments to add credibility. In this study, I 
proxy the business volume of the e-merchant for its reputation and trustworthiness, and 
test the following hypothesis: 
H4. E-merchants with smaller business volume benefit more from the presence of 
the online trust seal through increased sales than larger e-merchants 
 Previous shopping experience with a merchant is likely to play an important role 
on purchasing behavior as one would expect a satisfied customer to return for repeat 
purchases. As noted by Hosmer (1995), trust develops over time as a result of repeated 
transactions. Gefen et al. (2008), supporting Hosmer (1995)’s assertion, suggest that trust 
has a longitudinal dimension and the importance of trust diminishes over tim . As 
business partners get more experienced with each other over time, both parties start to 
focus on the value of the transaction rather than initial reputation. Fazio & Zanna (1981), 
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who developed the theory of attitude-behavior consistency, posit that for repeat 
customers, satisfaction with a merchant is a more important determinant of trust building 
than reputation and structural assurance. Hee-Woong et al. (2004) also distinguish 
between new and repeat customers and propose that customer satisfaction is the strongest 
antecedent of trust building for repeat customers. Consequently, having previously 
purchased from an e-merchant a few times, a repeat shopper probably needs less 
assurances about that e-merchant for his/her next purchase. The narrowed trust gap 
between the e-merchant and shoppers, after repeated transactions, is likely to reduce the 
need for a trusted third party’s involvement in the form of a trust seal. Thus I expect that: 
 H5. The value of the online trust seal diminishes as shoppers purchase more 
frequently and become repeat customers at a retailer’s website. 
      Integrating the five hypotheses discussed above, Figure-10 illustrates my model.
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3.3 DATA AND MEASURES 
3.3.1 Data 
 The dataset was obtained from a well-known trust-seal provider. It contains over a 
quarter million shopping carts, all created in the period January 1, 2007 through October 
18, 2007, by online shoppers at the 493 e-merchant websites all served by the focal 
provider’s trust seal. 
 The process of certification starts by online retailers applying to the seal provider 
to be certified. The seal provider vets the applicants by verifying the credentials and 
places a piece of HTML code at the approved retailers’ web sits. The code serves three 
purposes: to display the seal of trust, to provide some services required s ch as security 
encryption or purchase bonding demanded by the shopper and to transfer the transaction 
details at the merchant’s website into the seal provider’s own database, out of which the 
dataset was extracted. Each observation in this dataset contains a rich set of data about 
the shopping cart, such as the status of the cart (abandoned or completed), th  value of 
the cart (in US dollars), merchant ID, shopper ID, seal status (ON or OFF), cart start date, 
cart end date, type of experiment (seal test or other tests), and product category, in 
addition to other variables.  
 A key aspect of this dataset that enhances its empirical valueis th  presence of 
random seal tests. The seal provider, in agreement with the e-merchants, conducts “A/B 
Test” during specified periods to measure the impact of the focal trust seal on key site 
metrics. In this test, the participating e-merchants allow the seal provider to display the 
seal with 50 percent of the visitors to their web sites – so called A’s, while not displaying 
the seal with the other 50 percent – called B’s. The visitors wee s lected randomly to be 
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either an A or B, ensuring that it is only the presence of the seal that varies systematically 
between the two sets of visitors. Thus, these “A/B tests” allow me to establish causality 
and identify the impact of the presence of the trust seal on shoppers’ completion 
likelihood. 
 The unit of analysis is an online shopping cart in a retailer’s website which either 
displayed the seal or not. The data was collected by the seal provider from 493 different 
e-merchant web sites in the January 2007 – October 2007 period. The datasetrequir d 
some cleaning to remove inconsistencies inherent in many archival dat sets. For 
example, carts with blank values were deleted. Having sorted cart values, I observed the 
highest value among completed carts was $76,241.  Hence I treat $100K as a threshold, 
and classified the carts with values over $100K as outliers and delete  them from the 
dataset as well. The final data set comprised of 288,169 observations. 
 Table-9 provides some descriptive statistics about the seal tests. It can be 
observed that the records pertaining to “seal ON” are not significa tly different from 
“seal OFF” thus providing evidence that shopping carts in both categories are distributed 
very similarly, except for the status of the seal. For example, the seal was displayed with 
49.5 percent of the carts which points to the success of the “A/B seal te t” to be discussed 
in the methodology section. The average cart value was $257 with the Seal ON while it 
was $255 when the seal was turned OFF. Similarly, comparing the two subsets, no 
significant difference is seen in terms of total number of other displayed seals and the 
percent share of each category. Thus, I can conclude that the distribution of carts is very 
similar except for the status of the seal, which provides evidence that the experiment 
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successfully eliminates external factors and thus allows us to infer about the causality of a 
cart’s completion probability.  
Table-9: Descriptive summary statistics of the dataset 
 SEAL ON SEAL OFF 
Number of carts 142,497 145,672 
Percent of total 49.5 % 50.5 % 
Number of all carts completed 35,704 33,940 
% of all carts completed 25.1 % 23.3 % 
Mean cart value, SD $257, $1,134 $255, $1,203 
Total number of other seals (mean, SD) 0.43, 0.81 0.45, 0.82 
% of all carts in Furniture category 16.1 % 15.3 % 
% of all carts in Books category 7.5 % 7.5 % 
 
 The shopping carts in the dataset include a variety of product categories. The seal 
provider categorized the products offered by the e-merchants into 25 different categories. 
The top 5 categories, their average cart values, and completion rates are shown in Table-
10. Surprisingly, furniture and sporting goods were the most frequently shopped 
categories, while books, comprising a low-risk and low price category, had the highest 
completion rate among all categories as expected. 
Table-10: Top five product categories according to the count of carts in the dataset 
Category Average cart value Percent of completed carts in this 
category  
Sporting goods $309 20.8 
Furniture $436 36.8 
Movies $81 29.3 
Books $85 40.0 
Toys $106 26.5 
 
3.3.2 Measures 
 The descriptive statistics of the five different variables used in the comprehensive 
model are provided below in Table-11.  
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Table-11: Descriptive statistics of the measures 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Completed 0.24  0 1 
Seal_ON 0.49  0 1 
Merchant volume $1.48 million  $1.73 million 0 $4.21 million 
Cart value $256 $1,169 $0.1 $93K 
Number of other seals 0.45 0.82 0 4 
 
 The dependent variable “Completed” is binary and takes the value of “1” if the 
cart is completed, “0” otherwise. My dataset is comprised of shopping carts and provides 
no information regarding the behavior of shoppers who left before creating  cart. 
Therefore, “Completion rate” is the percentage of the checked-out (paid and purchased) 
carts among all created carts. The average completion rate of all carts in the dataset is 24 
percent.  
 The independent variable “Seal_ON” is binary and takes the value of “1” when 
the seal is displayed and “0” otherwise. As the dataset consists of the carts that went 
through the seal experiment, roughly half of the carts had the seal ON while the other half 
did not observe the seal for experimental purposes. 
 “Cart Value” is the final dollar value of the cart when the shopper ch cked out, or 
abandoned the cart. The cart value has a sample mean of $256 and ranges f om $0.1 to 
$93,000. 
 “Merchant Volume” variable is a measure of e-merchant size. It was computed by 
summing up the dollar value of all completed carts for each e-merchant in the dataset.  
Average merchant volume turned out to be $1.48 million with a SD of $1.73 million and 
range of $0 up to $ 4.21 million (A few online stores had opened carts but none 
completed). Most of the online retailers in the dataset are small to medium sized 
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merchants that do not have established brand names as well as any brick and mortar sales 
presence. 
 In addition to the seal, the seal provider also kept track of the presnc  of 14 other 
trust seals in the retailers’ web sites. It is observed that 69 percent of the e-merchants 
displayed no other trust seal, 22 percent displayed one other seal, 6 p rcent displayed two 
other seals, and 3 percent displayed three or more other seals. Excluding the seal 
provider’s own seal, on average 0.45 other trust seals were displayed by the merchants, 
statistically ranging between 0 and 4. A total of 15 trust seals (including the focal seal) 
were considered in my analysis which includes the following: BBB, izRate, Geotrust, 
Google-Checkout, NexTag, PayPal, VeriSign, buySAFE, Truste, PriceRunner, Comodo, 
ControlScan, RapidSSL, ScanAlert and Thawte. Treating each of thether seals equally, 
I have counted the number of other seals in each retailer’s web site and called this “Total 
Number of Other Seals”. To test for the diminishing marginal returns of additional seals, 
I have log-transformed this variable in the regression model. 
 I use a limited version (137,162 observations) of the comprehensive datast to test 
my hypothesis relating to shopper experience because clustering a shopper’s multiple 
carts into a shopping experience variable requires a unique identifier of that shopper. I 
used the e-mail addresses of shoppers for this purpose and not all shopper  progressed far 
enough in the shopping process to enter their email addresses. This filter ng process 
resulted in a subset of shoppers who were closer to completion than those in th  
comprehensive dataset. Hence, it is observed that the percentage of completed carts in the 
limited model is 68 percent, much higher than the equivalent 24 percent of 
comprehensive dataset, as presented in Table-12. The seal was “ON” for slightly over 50 
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percent of carts as expected. Next I take a closer look at the key variable, “Shopper 
Experience”. 
Table-12: Some descriptive statistics for the experience dataset 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Completed 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Seal_ON 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Shopper Experience per Merchant 2.12 17.98 0 343 
 
 “Shopper Experience” variable indicates the number of repeat purchases 
(excluding the first visit) that a shopper made at an e-merchant’s website. It is interesting 
to see that shoppers in the dataset were usually loyal customer f a single store rather 
than shopping across the 490 different e-merchants. Shopper experience per m rchant 
and total shopper experience across all merchants are almost identical with almost a 
perfect correlation of 0.99. An average shopper in the dataset made 2.12 rpeat purchases 
and the most experienced shopper completed 343 carts at a single e-merchant’s websi e.  
3.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 Since the dependent variable “Completed” is binary, I use a logistic regression 
model. (Agresti, 2002). Using the comprehensive dataset, I estimate the following model. 
LOG(PI {I1} / PI {I0}) = β0 + β1Seal_ON + β2Cart Value + β3Seal_ON*Cart Value 
+ β4Merchant Size + β5Seal_ON* Merchant Size + β6log(Total Number of Other 
Seals) + Categorical dummies + ε 
where PI {I1} is the probability that cart number I is completed an  PI {I0} is the 
probability that cart number I is not completed. 
 In order to gather the data about a shopper’s repeat purchases at each e-merchant, 
I used the email addresses provided by shoppers as a unique ID. However, not all 
shoppers provided this information and I had to drop the carts without an email address. 
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Therefore, I estimate the following model using the limited dataset to test my shopper 
experience hypotheses. 
LOG(PI {I1} / PI {I0}) = β0 + β1Seal_ON + β2Shopper Experience + β3Seal_ON*Shopper 
Experience + Categorical dummies + ε
 The distributions of “Merchant size” and “Cart value” variables are highly 
skewed right. In order to address this non-linearity, I have tried two transformations on 
these two variables: logging or normalizing them. Normalization of a variable includes 
subtracting its mean (centering) and then diving by its standard eviation (scaling). 
Finding that normalizing the cart value and merchant size variables provides a better fit, I 
have transformed these two variables into standard normal distribution. Thus, a unit 
increase in the normalized “Merchant size” variable refers to a one SD increase in actual 
merchant size. 
As logistic regression is not subject to many of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
assumptions, such as normal distribution of the error terms, normal distribution of the 
dependent variables and homo-scedasticity, I have only tested for a possible “over-
dispersion” of the model’s variance and could not find any evidence of over-dispersion in 
my model. 
 My primary purpose in this paper is to investigate the effect of online trust seals 
on likelihood of completion of shopping cart by a consumer, and to study some 
operational factors that could help online retailers better manage the display of trust seals 
on their websites.  I first examine the relationship between the ind pendent variable 
“Seal_ON “and cart completion variable “Completed”. The independent variables include 
Seal_ON, Cart Value, Merchant Size, Number of Other Trust Seals and Shopper 
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Experience. I also added interaction terms to investigate the possible moderating effects 
of the seal on other independent variables. Finally, I add control variables (product 
categories) for a more comprehensive model.  
3.5 RESULTS 
 I have statistical support for three out of the five hypotheses. While 
acknowledging that large sample size could actually inflate t-statistics, the model fit 
statistics (log-likelihood, pseudo R-squared, AIC and BIC) in Table-14a show evidence 
that my model provides a reasonable fit to the data. In fact, several comparison models 
(see Appendix G) suggest that the model fit cannot be improved much further. Finally, 
the correlation matrix, provided in Table-13, show no indication of collinear ty among 
independent variables.  
Table-13: Correlation matrix for the comprehensive model 
 Seal_ON Cart 
Value 
Merchant Vol. Total Number  
of Seals 
Seal_ON  1    
Cart Value  0.001 1   
Merchant Volume -0.041 0.097 1  
Total Number of Seals -0.016 -0.062 -0.376 1 
 
 Looking at the results in Table-14a, it is observed that all coeffi ients in my 
comprehensive model are highly significant, except two: “Total Number of Other Seals” 







Table-14a: Regression analysis results for the comprehensive model 
Dependent Variable: Completed   
LogLikelihood: -153,810;         AIC =307,642;      BIC=307,758;      Pseudo R2: 0.0348 
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -1.380*** -164.99 
Seal_ON  0.144***   15.72 
Cart Value -0.436***  -20.01 
Seal_ON x Cart Value  0.019     0.63 
Merchant Volume  0.267***   36.56 
Seal_ON x Merchant Volume -0.160***  -17.43 
Log (Total Number of Other Seals)  -0.013    -0.96 
Categorical dummies   
*** p < 0.001 
 
 Table-14a shows that that the coefficient of the variable “Seal_ON” equals 0.144 
and is highly significant. Assuming all other independent variables at their means, this 
positive coefficient indicates that presence of the trust seal at n e-merchant’s web site 
increases the odds of cart completion at that web site by 15.49 percent (e0.144), hence 
lending support to Hypothesis-1. Thus, I can say that fewer carts are ab ndoned in the 
presence of the trust seal. 
 Next, I examine the effect of each additional trust seal on cart completion 
likelihood. Surprisingly, the log-transformed “Total Number of Other Seals” variable is 
negative and insignificant, which indicates that additional trust seals do not increase the 
shopper trust and conversion rates. Thus, it seems that there is no statistical support for 
the second hypothesis. However, this rather surprising result led me to investigate 
alternative functional relationships between the number of seals and conversion. Recall 
that the log transformation postulates a relationship of diminishing returns which, a 
priori, seemed rather reasonable. However, the results show that diminishing returns 
appear to not hold in the context of online trust seals. An alternative (and somewhat 
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related) hypothesis is that the number of seals has a positive impact on conversion, at 
least up to a certain point, and that after that point the inclusion of additional seals will 
lead to a negative impact on conversion. Mathematically, this leads to an inverse U-
shaped relationship. One can model such an inverse U-shape with the help of a second 
order polynomial in the total number of seals (i.e. via the inclusion of a linear and a 
square term). Table-14b shows the results. First, note that this model pr vides a better fit 
to the data (as evidenced by the higher values of the log-likelihood and pseudo R-squared 
and lower values of AIC and BIC). In other words, the inverse U-shape appears to better 
reflect the behavior of shoppers online.  
Table-14b: Comprehensive model with square terms 
Dependent Variable: Completed   
LogLikelihood: -153,726;      AIC =307,518;      BIC=307,645;        Pseudo R2: 0.0352 
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -1.390*** -165.63 
Seal_ON 0.142*** 15.52 
Cart Value -0.441*** -20.16 
Seal_ON x Cart Value 0.018 0.62 
Merchant Volume -0.274*** 37.48 
Seal_ON x Merchant Volume -0.158*** -17.26 
Total Number of Other Seals 0.178*** 9.39 
(Total Number of Other Seals)2 -0.063*** -10.85 
Categorical dummies   
*** p < 0.01 
 
  Table-14b shows that both the first degree and second degree polynomial ter s 
are highly significant, which is surprising given the insignifican e of the logarithmic 
relationship. I again take this as strong evidence for the inverse U-shaped effect. 
 The first degree term has a coefficient of 0.178 and the second degree t rm has a 
coefficient of -0.063, both being statistically significant. Taking the partial derivative of 
“Y=Completed” with respect to the variable “X= Total Number of Other Seals”, and 
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equating to zero, I find that the probability of cart completion is maxi ized at Xm = 
1.413, which means displaying 1.413 other seals results in an optimum. Based on the 
regression model’s coefficients, I have plotted Figure-11 to visualize this inverted “U” 
shape relationship. It is seen that displaying more than three other trust seals could even 
have a negative impact on sales of online stores and excluding the focal seal, the 
optimum range is between one and two other seals. As detailed in Appendix F, I also 
performed a series of additional robustness checks on the precise form of the functional 
relationship and the value of the optimal number of seals by combining all seals, adding a 
third degree polynomial term, and replacing the polynomial terms with dummies. The 
inverted “U” shape finding remains robust and the AIC values consiste tly improve over 
the first model in Table-14a. 
Figure-11: The impact of total number of other seals on cart completion likelihood 
Impact of seal count on completion
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4






 Going back to the earlier results in Table-14a, the “Cart Value” variable has a 
negative significant coefficient of -0.436, indicating that higher value carts have a lower 
likelihood of completion. Contrary to my predictions, introduction of the seal does not 
moderate the impact of cart value on cart completion likelihood, as the interaction term 
 
 64
“Seal_ON x Cart Value” has an insignificant coefficient. (Z = 0.63) Hence, there is no 
statistical support for Hypothesis 3. 
 It is observed that carts created at websites of larger retailers have a higher 
likelihood of completion as the coefficient of “Merchant Volume” variable is positive 
0.267 and significant The coefficient of the interaction term “Seal_ON x Merchant 
Volume” is negative, -0.160 and significant, which shows the moderating effect of the 
seal between merchant size and cart completion likelihood, and that smaller online 
retailers benefit more from the presence of the seal. Moving left by 1 SD at the 
“Merchant Volume” axis, i.e. from $ 3.21 million (sample mean + 1 SD) down to $ 1.48 
million (sample mean), the odds of cart completion is reduced by 30.6 percent; however 
in the presence of the seal the reduction in odds of cart completion is only 11.3 percent. 
Thus, I have support for Hypothesis-4 as it is seen that presence of the seal moderates the 
impact of merchant volume on cart completion  
 Finally, I examine the results for “shopper experience” (see Table-14c) and find 
support for Hypothesis 5. The “Shopper Experience” variable has a positive significant 
sign (0.391) which means repeat shoppers are more likely to complete their carts than 
novice shoppers at a particular online store. The interaction term “Seal x Shopper 
Experience” has a negative significant coefficient (-0.107) as well but smaller in 
magnitude when compared to Shopper Experience variable, meaning that the v lue of the 
seal is lower for more experienced shoppers, lending support to Hypothesis-5. Comparing 
two shoppers - Alice: novice shopper, and Bob: repeat shopper who has previously 
purchased once at a particular retailer’s web site, all else equal it could seen that Bob’s 
odds of cart completion at that online retailer is higher by 20.97 percent compared to 
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Alice. In the presence of the seal, the odds of cart completion for Bob at that retailer are 
only 7.90 percent higher than for Alice. The value of the seal is significantly lower for an 
experienced shopper, indicating that trust seals and prior shopping experience at the 
retailer are partial substitutes.  
Table-14c: Regression analysis results for the experience model 
Dependent Variable: Completed   
LogLikelihood:-77,216,     AIC :152,327,     BIC :152,474,        Pseudo R2: 0.0958 
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -0.025*   -1.91 
Seal_ON 0.391***   30.36 
Shopper Experience  0.183***   29.07 
Seal_ONx Shopper Experience -0.107*** -14.76 
Categorical dummies   
*** p < 0.01       * p < 0.10  
 
3.6 DISCUSSION 
 My findings provide empirical evidence that the presence of trust seals in online 
retailers’ websites increases the completion likelihood of shopping carts, thus resulting in 
increased sales for the retailers displaying the seal. The risk that originates from 
information asymmetry perceived by consumers when shopping from an unknown 
retailer is partially mitigated when a trusted third party endorses the quality claims of the 
e-merchant through a trust seal. The seal acts as an additional quality signal for the online 
retailer and reduces the amount of information asymmetry faced by the shoppers, thereby 
easing the purchasing decision of the shoppers.  
 To quantify the effect of the trust seal on final sales, let’s assume that a typical 
online store, not displaying the trust seal, had $1 million in revenue in 2007. Based on the 
descriptive statistics, where an average cart has a value of $250 and one third odds of 
completion (completion rate = 0.25), an online store (with $1 million in sales) has 4,000 
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completed carts ($ 1 million / $250) out of the 16,000 created carts (4,000 / 0.25) in 2007. 
The results show that the trust seal increases odds of cart completi n by 15.49 percent. If 
the online store displayed the seal, its odds of completion would increase from 0.333 to 
0.385, which would boost the total number of completed carts to 4,448. Inducing 448 
more cart completions valued at $250 each, the seal would bring in and additional 
$112,000 revenue. This is just the seal’s impact on the completion rates, assuming that 
presence of the seal does not help generate any new carts. Thus, I can conclude that 
presence of the seal at an online store increases the e-merchant’s revenue by 
approximately 11.2 percent. 
 This study primarily focused on completion rates of shopping carts created by 
customers. My data does not allow us me to examine the impact of trust seals on the 
creation of these shopping carts. However, the finding that “presence of trust seals 
increases odds of cart completion” can be generalized to conversion rates as well for two 
reasons: First of all, completion rate is a subset of conversion rate and assuming all else 
fixed, an increase in completion rate naturally leads to some incr ase in conversion rate. 
However, whether the online visitors who quit the store at the introductory stage perceive 
the trust seals as useful as shoppers who have actually created a cart is a valid question. 
Ba (2001) suggests that trust between two online parties could vary at different stages of 
the relationship depending on the degree of familiarity as elborated in Table-15. 
However, McKnight et al. (2004) studied this issue in more depth and found no 
significant difference in trust factors (i.e. structural assurance, dispositional trust) 
between early introductory stages of an online B2C relationship and the following 
exploratory stages later.  Thus, an additional support to my generalization, I can say that 
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the trust seals should be effective on visitors as well, although the extent of the influence 
may be more or less, a question suitable for future studies.  
Table-15: Classification of customers at an online store 
Visitor Shopper Buyer 
Introductory stage Exploratory stage Final stage 
Just browses the e-
merchant’s web site 
Adds some items to the 
cart 
Completes the cart and 
purchases from the e-
merchant 
 
 The analysis also sheds light on how the trust seal interacts with some e-
commerce variables, which could aid e-merchants in re-designing some operational 
processes. First of all, my expectations that the seal would be mor  effective towards 
completion of high value carts, was not supported empirically. This finding suggests that 
shoppers could be considering the additional risk brought by higher value purchases 
before adding items to the cart, perhaps simultaneously considering it with merchant’s 
reputation, quality of the web site, or initial viewing of the trust seals. Thus, the results 
point to the need for additional research in investigating the relationship between 
shopping stages and price related risk perception in online shopping. 
 Similar to conventional environments, a shopper’s trust in an online retaile  is 
likely to increase after a few successful online transactions. Thus, experienced shoppers 
are less likely to pay attention to quality signals but focus on details of the transaction. 
However, shoppers who have not yet interacted sufficiently with a particul r retailer - 
novice shoppers - have more difficulty in making a purchase decision. This research finds 
that these novice shoppers feel more comfortable when the online retail r displays the 
seal on its website. The additional risk faced by a shopper due to lack of enough 
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experience with a particular e-merchant is mitigated significantly by the presence of a 
trust seal.  
 Not surprisingly, large online retailers such as amazon.com do not display any 
trust seals on their websites. In this model, I have proxied the sum of an e-merchant’s 
completed carts (business volume) for its reputation. Online retailers with larger sales 
volume are likely to have built a good reputation and be known and trusted by more 
consumers. The results complete the puzzle by finding that the presnce of the seal at 
small e-merchants’ websites is likely to bridge the reputation gap suffered by the e-
merchants. In the presence of the seal, the additional risk perceived by shoppers due to 
smaller e-merchant size is partially mitigated by the presence of the trust seal. Thus I find 
that the online trust seal partially substitutes for both shopper exri nce, as well as seller 
size/sales-volume. 
 At this stage, it is important to acknowledge that some online retailers’ web sites 
could display more than one trust seal. Referring to the results in Table-14a, I don’t see a 
diminishing marginal return of an additional trust seal. Further analysis indicates that 
there is an inverted “U” shape relationship between the total number of other seals and 
cart completion likelihood, with a maximum point “Xm” at 1.41 other seals. The presence 
of the main trust seal has been controlled for by the “Seal_ON” variable, which has a 
mean of 0.49 (due to the random ONs and OFFs). Thus, it can then be said that the 
optimum number of trust seals for an online retailer to display is equal to 1.90 (1.41 + 
0.49). The results suggest that online retailers benefit the most by limiting the number of 
trust seals displayed on their websites, with more seals even harming their shoppers’ 
purchase/completion rates.  
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 The inverted “U” shaped relationship between the number of seals disp ayed by 
the retailer and the odds of cart completion could be attributed to the f llowing. Firstly, it 
is possible that some shoppers may not be aware of the function of the different trust 
seals and could be confused by the presence of many seals which would then ead to an 
abandoning of carts. Secondly, shoppers may suffer from “feature fatigue” and find it too 
complex to process the additional information brought about by the pres nc  of many 
seals. As suggested by Mick & Fournier (1998) and Thompson et al. (2005), while more 
features increase the attractiveness of a product, the addition of new features also 
increases product complexity, resulting in consumer anxiety and stress. Finally, the 
presence of too many seals may make the shoppers skeptical about the nline retailer’s 
trustworthiness. It is possible that the presence of a large number of trust seals signals the 
“desperation” of a less reputable seller to attract consumers. Additional empirical studies 
would be needed to further tease out these effects.  
3.7 IMPLICATIONS 
 This research offers several implications for different stakeholders in e-
commerce: the seal providers, the online retailer displaying those seals, and the broader 
e-commerce world, which are discussed below. 
 First of all, I believe that the findings can help bridge the gap between the 
conflicting findings of the academia and industry figures that strongly support the 
effectiveness of online trust seals. Despite the mixed findings of the acadmia highlighted 
earlier in Section 3.1, industry publications consistently regard online trust seals highly. 
For example, VeriSign claims that use of its seal and SSL solutions result in twenty 
percent average increase in transactions. BuySAFE claims an average ten percent 
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increase in website conversion, while TRUSTe publishes on its web site that presence of 
its privacy seal at online stores results in up to twenty nine percent increased sales. The 
results offer seal providers independent empirical validation regarding the value of trust 
seals. Based on actual shopping data, rather than on a survey of consumer perceptions, I 
show that the presence of trust seals reduce the percentage of bandoned shopping carts, 
thus increasing completion and conversion rates of online retailers.  
 Seal providers would benefit by targeting small online retailers as a customer base 
that can make most use of trust seals. As I have shown, small e-merchants benefit more 
from the presence of the trust seal. Consequently, trust seal providers can benefit by re-
designing their pricing policies and provide discounts to attract larger merchants who are 
less likely to benefit from the presence of trust seals on their w b sites. Some seal 
providers keep a directory of their approved online retailers on their web sites and allow 
shoppers to search for certified online stores. This search mechanism can direct consumer 
traffic to the more profitable e-merchants based on the seal pricing policy, hence 
optimizing profits for the provider.  
 The results also provide some useful guidelines for the design of online retailers’ 
operations. For example, based on my findings that the seal is more effective in 
converting novice shoppers, online retailers can make the seal more visibl and salient 
during sessions initiated by first time visitors. Also, given that“more is not necessarily 
better” with trust seals, online retailers would do well by being selective about displaying 
only the most effective seals. Finally, addressing the warnings of researchers that 
establishing trust in the online world is critical to the development of e-commerce, I 
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provide evidence that trust seals indeed do function to partially bridge the inherent trust 
gap in the internet. 
 The findings are also of importance to policy makers and regulatory uthorities. 
While the lack of institutionalized regulation has arguably contributed to the rapid growth 
of online commerce, it has also led to the emergence of several fly-by-night operators 
making it difficult for consumers to credibly verify the quality of several online sellers. 
Given that online trust seals and certificates are valued by consumers, encouraging them 
to consummate their purchases at online retailers, it is important th t these third-party 
certifiers themselves act as independent entities. Consumers and the market as a whole 
would benefit if these third-party certifiers are held to high standards by regulatory 
oversight.    
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 Using actual shopping-cart and purchase data collected from field experiments 
conducted on certified online retailer web sites by a leading trust-seal provider, this study 
quantifies the effectiveness and value of online trust seals as a form of trust transfer 
mechanism in a B2C setting. Overall, I find that trust seals help convert more shoppers 
into buyers; however they could be more effective if online retailers re-design some 
operational processes such that these trust seals are displayed two at a time, displayed 
more prominently to first-time shoppers, and made more salient at sm ller retailers’ 
websites. Not all trust seals possibly adhere to the same high standards, but trust seals 
serve as quality-signaling mechanisms assuring online shoppers that the certified online 
retailers are reliable and trustworthy. This is among the first large-scale study of the value 
of online trust seals that provides tangible evidence of their effectiveness.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISSERTATION CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 Through our findings in this dissertation, we can conclude that supply chain 
technology solutions could influence the trust among supply chain members in different 
ways. While, downstream in the supply chain, trust seals could increase the consumers’ 
trust in the online retailer, upstream distributors using VMI could experience trust erosion 
in their relationship with the manufacturers as depicted in Figure-12. Thus, in adopting 
boundary-spanning supply chain technologies, it is of utmost importance to consider the 
effects of the technology on relationship parameters, such as trust. 
Figure-12: Effect of VMI and Trust seals on relationships along the supply chain 
 
 More specifically, our findings have some important implications on the users of 
supply chain technologies. Manufacturers that use VMI to replenish their distributors’ 
inventories should make sure that adoption of VMI does not decrease the communication 
with distributors. Multi-lateral communication with the distributors could help ensure that 
any violation of the psychological contract with the distributor is realized before it breaks 
down distributor trust in the manufacturer. Both the distributors and manufacturers 
should be explicit and clear in designing the terms of the VMI relationship and write 
these down in the form of a formal contract to limit the ruling of psychological contract 
later in the relationship. Online retailers, especially small-to-medium sized ones, could 
Manufacturers Distributors Retailers Consumers 
VMI Trust seals 
Trust Erosion Increased trust 
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bridge the confidence gap felt by choppers by using trust seals. The retailers could design 
their operations such that these seals are displayed more prominently to first time visitors 
and only a few of these seals are displayed at a time.  
The two essays in this dissertation have some limitations accompanied by future 
research opportunities. The cross-sectional nature of the data makes it impossible to 
validate the causal links of our model in the first essay. In the future, it will be of 
significant importance to validate the causal links using longitudinal data. Surveying 
manufacturers to investigate the evolution of their trust in distributors would be an 
important enhancement to our study as well. We have proposed that VMI relationships 
are subject to trust erosion because of some idiosyncratic attributes of the VMI. However, 
we do not make any generalization of this conclusion to all buyer-supplier relationships 
(including those not using VMI). In the future, our model could be tested on a sample 
including both adopters and non-adopters of VMI to find out whether inter-organizatio al 
trust evolves differently in a general buyer-seller relationship. Finally, upon collection of 
a larger set of observations, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) could be used in Essay-
1, to model the relationship between our multiple constructs in a single model. 
 The second essay of this dissertation is also subject to some limitations as well. At 
an online store, many visitors just browse and leave without creating any cart. The dataset 
of the second essay is comprised of shopping carts which allows us to measure the impact 
of the seal among shoppers, who actually created a cart. Thus, the dataset provides no 
clues regarding how visitors, who quit early before creating the cart, view the trust seal. 
Follow-up studies could use actual sessions or click-stream data gathered from online 
merchants to verify the value of trust seals on both conversion (converting b owsers to 
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shoppers) as well as completion rates. The second limitation is that the results are valid 
for US merchants and shoppers in general but require caution before g neralizing to other 
regions. Hofstede (1980) views trust as a variable that distinguishes on  society from 
another. Gefen et al. (2008) suggest that culture is a moderator of trust. Thus, external 
validity of the results can be enhanced by testing the research questions with non-US 
data. 
 Finally, in this second essay, we have investigated in details the impact of a single 
well-known trust seal on shoppers’ purchasing behavior. Although, we believe that the 
results can be generalized to other quality trust seals, each seal category could still have 
some inherent differences. For-example, in terms of inducing trust, check-out seals such 
as “PayPal” and “Google Check-Out” may be perceived differently compared to price 
comparison seals, such as “BizRate” and “NexTag”. Also it is important to note that not 
all seals are of equal quality. The differential impact of seal types on conversion rates 












APPENDIX A: Pre-notification letter 
 
Dear [First Name], 
   
Back in May 2010 at our annual Forum, we had a speaker from the Speed of Trust. For 
those of you who were unable to attend, his presentation talking to the value of trust in 
our business relationships was very thought provoking and well received.  As it so 
happens, Koray, Martin and Oliver – researchers at the University of Maryland and 
Lehigh University, then contacted me about their research project in evolution of trust in 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationships. I would like to inform you about this exc ting 
project today as your firm is an active user of VMI.  
 
 
This research project aims to investigate the users’ satisfaction with the VMI technology 
and the impact of VMI on their relationship with suppliers. Koray plans to conduct an 
online survey of buyers (distributors) actively using VMI and also asked us if we could 
provide data about inventory results of these VMI relationships. He would then like to 
correlate those inventory results to the inter-organizational trust characterized by the 
answers to the survey. I think the idea that Koray is looking at is very interesting and I 
would like to help him.  
 
 
I invite you to participate in this online survey which takes about 15-20 minutes to 
complete. The link to join this survey will soon be emailed to you. As you know the data 
is yours not ours so I also need your permission to share your inventory results. Towards 
the end of the survey, you will find a box to check if you would allow us to share your 
inventory transaction results with the University of Maryland. I have been assured that no 
attributable data will be shared beyond the survey team and that a summary report of the 





















APPENDIX B: Solicitation letter  
 
Dear [First Name],  
 
I am contacting you to follow up on a recent email that you received from Carl Hall, CEO 
of Datalliance.  He emailed you to ask for your participation in a study of Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI) relationships being conducted by researchers at the University 
of Maryland and Lehigh University.  Both Carl and I believe that a better understanding 
of VMI relationships will allow users to cultivate more profitable, longer lasting business 
partnerships.  
 
I am asking you to participate in this study. Your answers will be held strictly 
confidential.  Only summary results of the study will be released.  
 
As a token of appreciation, if you complete the survey, I will donate $2 to the National 
Wildlife Federation (http://www.nwf.org), a charity that is helping wildlife recover from 





This link is uniquely tied to this survey and your email address. Please do not forward 
this message.  
 
If you have any questions, please email me at kozpolat@rhsmith.umd.edu or call me at 
301 405-5775.  
 




Koray Özpolat  
PhD Candidate  
R. H. Smith School of Business  




Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from us, please click the link 








APPENDIX C: First reminder email 
Dear [First Name],  
 
 
Sorry, for the follow-up email, but I am contacting you regarding the recent note that you 
received from Carl Hall, CEO of Datalliance asking for your participation in a study of 
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) relationships being conducted by researchers at the 
University of Maryland and Lehigh University.    
 
I would greatly appreciate you completing the VMI survey by April 1. It should only take 
10 minutes. Your input is very important to us and will be held strictly confidential. As a 
token of appreciation, I will donate $2 to the National Wildlife Federation 
(http://www.nwf.org), a charity that is helping wildlife recover from the recent Gulf oil 





If you have any questions or would prefer to complete a paper survey, please call me at 
301 405-5775 or email me at kozpolat@rhsmith.umd.edu.  
 




Koray Özpolat  
PhD Candidate  
University of Maryland  
 
 
Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from us, please click the link 

















APPENDIX D: Second reminder email 
 
Dear [First Name],  
 
I would like to kindly remind you that our VMI survey is still active for your 
participation and would appreciate if you could take just 10 minutes to complete the 




This research project will help us learn more about the influence of using VMI on buyer-
seller relationships. We will also donate $2 to the National Wildlife Foundation as a 
token of appreciation for your contribution.  
 
This is the last invitation email and we will permanently close the collectrs for this 
survey on Friday April 8.  
 
Thanks for your time!  
 
Koray Özpolat  
PhD Candidate  
University of Maryland  
Tel: 301-405-5775  
 





















APPENDIX E: The questionnaire 
1. I am familiar with most aspects of our relationship with this supplier 
 a) Strongly agree       b) Agree       c) Not sure      d) Disagree     e) Strongly disagree 
 
2. What position do you hold in your firm? ___________________________ 
 
3. Which supply chain position do you consider as the main part of your business? 
 a) Retailer        b) Manufacturer       c) Service Provider      
               d) Wholesaler or distributor             e) Raw materials supplier 
 
4. How many employees does your firm have (all locations)?    
        a) Less than 50    b) 51 – 200       c) 201 – 500      d) 501-1000      e) 1,001 or more 
 
5. Please indicate the total revenues for your firm (all locations) in 2010 (or fiscal year 2010) by 
selecting the appropriate number below.  
 a)  Less than $ 1 million              b) $ 1 million - $ 4.99 million      c) $ 5 million - $ 19.99 million       
 d) $ 20 million - $50 million       e) More than $ 50 million 
 
6. What was your firm’s Return on Sales in 2010 
 a) Negative      b) 0-5 percent      c) 6 -10 percent      d) More than 10 percent     e) I don’t know 
 
7. How long has your firm been doing business with this supplier? (Round to the nearest year) 
        a) Less than a year    b) 1-2 years    c) 3-4 years   d) 5-6 years     e) 7 years or more 
 
8. How long have you been personally involved in your firm’s relationship with this supplier?(Round 
to the nearest year) 
   a) Less than a year    b) 1-2 years    c) 3-4 years    d) 5-6 years     e) 7 years or more 
 
9. How long has your firm been using VMI with this supplier? (Round to the nearest year) 
  a) Less than a year   b) 1-2 years    c) 3-4 years     d) 5-6 years    e) 7 years or more 
 
10. Is your firm an independent distributor of this supplier? 
                a) Yes       b) No 
 
11. The communication between our firm and this supplier has increased since adoption of VMI. 
  a) Strongly agree     b) Agree        c) Not sure       d) Disagree    e) Strongly disagree 
 
12. This supplier had a strong influence in our firm’s decision to adopt VMI 
 a) Strongly agree      b) Agree        c) Not sure       d) Disagree    e) Strongly disagree 
 
13. In what industry does your firm mainly operate? Please circle the appropriate option or, write the 
industry next to the “Other” choice. 
      a) Electrical                b) Plumbing      c) Truck parts        d) Health Care      
      e) Consumer Goods   f) Other ___________________ 
 
14. Approximately what percentage of firms in your industry uses a VMI arrangement with their 
suppliers? 
              a) Less than 20%      b) 20-40 %       c) 41-60 %      d) 61-80 %     e) 81 – 100 % 
 
15. Who has the ownership of inventory at your premises? 
    a) We have the ownership of inventory at our premises 




Construct* Items (adopted from) 
TRUST 
1. We receive fair treatment from this supplier. (Dyer and Chu, 2000) 
2. If given a chance, this supplier could take unfair advantage in our 
business relationship. (Dyer and Chu, 2000) 
3. When making important decisions, this supplier consider  our firm’s 
welfare as well as its own. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
4. Based on past experience, we can rely on this supplier to keep promises 
made to our firm. (Zaheer et al., 1998] 
5. This supplier is competent and capable of providing us with required 
products according to our specifications in a timely fashion. (Self 
developed) 
6. This supplier has a reputation for trustworthiness in the business world. 
(Dyer&Chu, 2000) 
 
PCV -     
Psychological 
Contract      
Violation 
When I think about what our firm contributed to therelationship with this 
supplier and what we received in return, I feel (Hill et al., 2009) 
1. pleased  
2. angry 
3. frustrated 
4. satisfied (self developed) 
5. cheated  
 
PTT –  
Propensity  
to  Trust 
1. Most business partners can be counted on to do what they say they will 
do.  (Mayer and Davis, 1999) 
2. These days, our business should be alert; otherwise some other firms are 
likely to take advantage of us. (Mayer and Davis, 1999) 
3. In dealing with our suppliers and customers, each and every aspect of 
the relationship should be written in a contract to prevent opportunistic 
behavior. (Self developed) 
 
PERFORMANCE 
1. Use of VMI has improved our fill rate to our customers. 
2. Use of VMI has allowed us to reduce our inventory related costs.  
3. Use of VMI has increased our inventory turnover. 
        (All self developed) 
 
* Measures employ the following 5 point scales: 












APPENDIX F: Additional trust seals analysis 
I have provided evidence in Section 3.5 that as the number of trust seal at an 
online store increases, shoppers’ propensity of cart completion first inc eases, reaches a 
maximum point at roughly two seals then decreases as more seals ar  displayed. 
Robustness checks of the inverted “U” shape finding are provided below. 
1) Count the seal with other seals: I generate a new variable “Total Number of 
all Seals” which counts not only other seals but the presence of the seal as well. Then I 
run the model by removing the “Seal_ON” variable to prevent collinearity.  The results 
show that 1.99 seals maximize the likelihood of shopper conversion. Thus, I find support 
to the inverted “U” shape finding as detailed in Table-9a 
Table-16a: Results of “All Seals” model with a 2nd order term 
Dependent Variable: Completed   
LogLikelihood: -153,726;     AIC =307,474;        BIC=307590;   Pseudo R2: 0.0353 
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -1.417*** -158.71 
Cart Value -0.428*** -19.93 
Seal_ON x Cart Value -0.003 -0.12 
Merchant Volume 0.295*** 39.96 
Seal_ON x Merchant Volume -0.192*** -20.38 
Total Number of All Seals 0.247*** 20.08 
(Total Number of All Seals)2 -0.062*** -18.72 
Categorical dummies   
*** p < 0.01 
 
 2) Add a third order term to test for further non-lineari ty: Next, I extend the 
first robustness check by adding a third order “Total Number of All Seals” term and see 
that the third order term is insignificant. The results in Table-9  show that 2.06 trust seals 




Table-16b: Results of “All Seals” model with a cubic term 
Dependent Variable: Completed   
LogLikelihood: -153,726;    AIC =307,476;     BIC=307603;      Pseudo R2: 0.0353 
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -1.417*** -154.11 
Cart Value -0.428*** -19.92 
Seal_ON x Cart Value -0.003 -0.12 
Merchant Volume 0.295*** 39.80 
Seal_ON x Merchant Volume -0.192*** -19.92 
Total Number of All Seals 0.244*** 11.73 
(Total Number of All Seals)2 -0.059*** -4.24 
(Total Number of All Seals)3 -0.0005 -0.22 
Categorical dummies   
 
 3) Use dummies:  The shopping carts in my dataset were exposed to a number of 
trust seals ranging from zero to five (including the seal). I take the “zero trust seal” as the 
reference and code other cases with 5 different dummies. For example, “3 seals” dummy 
is coded “1” when the total number of all seals displayed is equal to three. The dummies 
of four and five seals have negative coefficients while one, two and three seals dummies 
are positive. Inverted “U” shape finding is again supported as detailed in Table-9c. 
Table-16c: Results of “All Seals” model with seal dummies 
Dependent Variable: Completed   
LogLikelihood: -153,679;     AIC =307,387;   BIC=307535;      Pseudo R2: 0.0356 
 Coefficient Z-Value 
Constant -1.415*** -153.33 
Cart Value -0.427*** -19.85 
Seal_ON x Cart Value -0.006 -0.19 
Merchant Volume 0.291*** 39.16 
Seal_ON x Merchant Volume -0.185*** -19.02 
Dummy One Seal 0.184*** 16.43 
Dummy Two Seals 0.194*** 10.98 
Dummy Three Seals 0.343 13.40 
Dummy Four Seals -0.235*** -5.42 
Dummy Five Seals -0.237*** -4.44 
 
 83
Categorical dummies   
*** p < 0.01 
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